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ARTICLES
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION:
TOWARDS A RATIONALE FOR PREFERENCE
Lewis D. Solomon* and Judith S. Heeter**
I. Introduction
College campuses these days are not exactly scenes of joy and rapture;
nor do they seem to fit the former characterization either of complacent
apathy or explosive radicalism. Perhaps the writer of a 1972 editorial in
the New York Times on "The Education Issue" best described their con-
dition when he observed, "[h]igher education is in a financial as well as
emotional depression."'
It could be mere coincidence that in 1972 when this state of financial and
emotional depression existed in higher education, HEW promulgated the Higher
Education Guidelines (Guidelines) for implementation of affirmative action in
the hiring and promotion of women and specified minority and ethnic groups to
college and university faculties. Such a condition may today still exist in higher
education where affirmative action remains a confusing and hotly contested issue
on American campuses. Affirmative action alone certainly did not cause financial
and emotional difficulties for higher education; indeed, any problems inherent
in the implementation of the affirmative action Guidelines undoubtedly have
been further aggravated by independent personal and professional biases and
by the declining enrollments which signal fiscal difficulties and poor prospects
for faculty employment.2 Yet according to many commentators on the subject
of affirmative action, implementation of affirmative action under the Guidelines
has done little to alleviate, and may well have exacerbated, the "depressed" con-
dition existing in 1972.
This article explores conditions which necessitated promulgation of the
Guidelines and analyzes the requirements they impose, in the name of equal
opportunity, on institutions of higher education. It examines the impact of the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City Law School, B.A.
Cornell University 1963; J.D. Yale Law School 1966.** Law Clerk to the Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, A.B. University of Missouri-Columbia 1971; J.D. University of
Missouri-Kansas City 1976.
1 WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION 4 (W. Furniss and P. Graham eds. 1974).
2 "Under conditions of slow enrollment growth, the job market of the 1970's is quite
different from that of the 60's, and enrollment is likely to be virtually stationary overall in the
1970's." CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, MAKING ArFuLIATIVE
ACTION WORK IN HIGHER EDUCATION 3-4 (1975) thereinafter cited as Carnegie Council].
"New faculty hires ran at the rate of about 30,000 a year in the peak hiring years of the late
1960's and are likely to average about 6,000 a year in the 1980's, entirely or almost entirely
for replacements, not expansion." Id. at 62. But see, Cummings, College Enrollment in 1990
is Expected to be the Same as Today's, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1976 at 37, col. 2. See generally
Fleming, The Implementation of Affirmative Action Programs, in WOMEN IN HIGHER EDU-
CATION, supra note 1, at 224. See also, Discrimination in Higher Education: A Debate on
Faculty Employment, 7 Crv. ROTS. DIGEST 19 (1975): "The reasons blacks and women are
not pushing whites out of faculty positions in dramatic numbers is that there is little new hiring
going on."
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Guidelines on the conditions they were designed to correct, on the individuals
and institutions affected, and on the goals and values inherent in societal notions
of morality, civil liberty, and academic excellence. Finally, this article seeks to
examine the values which are, and which most effectively should be, accom-
modated in any successful program of affirmative action, and suggests the direc-
tion which may prove most satisfactory for pursuing an affirmative action policy
in the future. In developing a rationale for a policy of affirmative action and
offering suggestions for its improved implementation, we suggest values which
emphasize human needs and self-fulfillment.
As the following discussion reveals, the affirmative action issue is over-
whelmingly larger than "the law," and any proposed "solution" must recognize
and come to terms with the interrelated social, moral, economic and psycho-
logical factors involved. Affirmative action has powerful consequences for in-
dividual human beings, for social groups and institutions, and for the norms
and relationships of the interlocking structure we call society.
Decisions affecting such complexities demand a full analysis of all relevant
facts, so that certain problems of identifiable groups will be neither ignored nor
blamed on others. While it may be easier to focus on immediate solutions and
short-sighted goals and to follow simple explanations of human events, as op-
posed to understanding complex measurements, it is imperative that the diffi-
cult, broad and contextual view be taken: What are the interrelated values and
objectives involved in the affirmative action issue, and how can they best be
accommodated? Affirmative action clearly illustrates the important role that an
interdisciplinary social science approach can play in analyzing a problem and
outlining alternatives for purposes of social policy. Only by means of a rational
methodology for discovering and evaluating all variables in the context of broad
and long range effects will a satisfactory solution to the complex problem of
affirmative action be forthcoming.
II. The Problem: Discrimination by Institutions of Higher Learning
It is a plain fact that more white males have been college professors than
females or males of minority groups. The university, symbol of enlightenment,
has been-intentionally or not-a sexist,3 elitist,4 and racially exclusive5 institu-
3 The rule of thumb regarding women in higher education has been "the higher the
fewer." Jaffe, Women's Place in Academe, XV MMw.ST Q. 16 (1973). See Ebert, Economists
Say Universities Bias Against Women Exceeds Business, VII-4 CHRON. H. EDUC. 3 (1972).
In 1972, women held one-fifth of the faculty positions in colleges and universities, as com-
pared with one-third in 1870. Nationally, women were 33% of the instructors, 20% of the
assistant professors, 15% of the associate professors, and 9% of the full professors. Id. at 23.
See also L. LEwis, SCALING THE IVORY TOWER: MERIT AND ITS LIMITS IN ACADEMIC CAREERS
130 (1975). While the number of women receiving doctorates was steadily increasing, the
proportion of doctorates awarded to women bore little relationship to their opportunities for
faculty positions. For example, a study of Columbia University showed that from 1957 to
1968 the proportion of doctorates earned by women rose from 13% to 24%, but the per-
centage of women in tenured. positions on the graduate faculty remained constant-at slightly
over 2%. A 1970 report on the University of Wisconsin revealed that the proportion of
women in the Ph.D. programs in ten departments varied from 26% to 58%, but that the
proportion of women faculty members in these departments ranged from 9.6% to 19.3%. In
1968-69, women constituted 22% of the graduate students and were awarded 19% of the
Ph.D.'s in the Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, but there were no
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tion. Ironically, as the chief interpreter and molder of modem values, the uni-
versity community has apparently been unable to perceive the enormous problem
of discrimination in modem society and within its own ranks.6 Instead of lead-
ing, our universities have lagged; instead of being models of compliance, they
have been models of evasiveness.7 It is the purpose of this section to survey the
women among the more than 400 tenured professors of that graduate school. Murray, Economic
and Educational Inequality Based on Sex: An Overview, 118 CONG. REc. 5653 (1972) (re-
marks of Senator Hart). Prejudice against hiring academic women is manifested in depart-
mental practices as well as in the attitudes of hiring officials. According to the Office of Edu-
cation of HEW, women employed full-time in universities in 1972-73 earned on the average
$3500 less than their male counterpart. L. Lxwis, supra, at 131-32. See also, Average Salaries
of 252,000 College Faculty Members, VII-23 CHRON. H. EDuc. 1, 6 (1973) (women earning
17% less than men); Cook, Sex Discrimination at Universities, 58 AAUP BULL. 279, 281
(1971). A study conducted at Columbia University and reported in 1972 indicated that the
pattern of inequality continued in the area of promotions and distribution of men and women
by rank:
There were 195 male faculty at Columbia who received doctorates in the 1960's.
47% are assistant professors, 38% are associate professors and 15% are full professors.
There are 25 women fulltime faculty at Columbia in the same category. 96% (24)
are assistant professors, one is an associate professor (tenure granted this year,
Ph.D. 1961); there are no female full professors who obtained their Ph.D. in the
1960's at Columbia. Well over 50% of the men who earned their Ph.D.'s in 1963
and 1964 have been given tenure. None of the women in that group has been pro-
moted to the rank of associate professor with tenure, although one woman is an assis-
tant professor with tenure, an anomaly brought about by the extreme reluctance of
her department to promote her. These differences in promotion rates are too great
for discrimination against women not to be a large part of the story.
Murray, supra at 5658. For further data concerning grade average comparisons, and faculty
percentages, see R. LESTER, ANTIBIAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES 43-44 (1974); Ash-
craft, Comparison of Employment Status of Men and Women in Four-Year Public Institutions,
44 JOPHER 60, 61 (1973) ; Harris, Second Sex in Academe, 56 AAUP BULL. 283-290 (1970) ;
Sandler, Backlash in Academe: A Critique of the Lester Report, 76 TEACH. COLL. REc. 401,
402 (1975); Wall Street Journal, Labor Letter, July 13, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
4 See Harris, Problems and Solutions in Achieving Equality for Women, supra note 1.
Most people in academic life are elitists. There is a deliberate search in academic
life for "the best": the best student, the best teacher, the best performance. There-
fore, the aspirant for admission to the groves of academe must be the best available,
if the employing peers are to be satisfied. Because more men than women are en-
couraged to attend graduate school, present papers at meetings, and publish them, the
standard of competence has been established by male performance. More men than
women have been college teachers, and therefore, the only test of performance is that
of teachers who are already in the workplace.
Id. at 11. The same standard, of course, has operated to exclude minorities from academia.
The cause of "necessary elitism" consistently has been argued by those who contend that
affirmative action sacrifices academic excellence. See, e.g., D. 'BELL, THE COMING OF POST-
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 418 (1973); R. LESTER, ANTIBIAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES 14-15,
27 (1975);-Biaggi Attacks Af'irmative Action Plan, 124 CONG. Rzc. 31641 (1972) (remarks
of Congressman Podell). See generally, Bunzel, The Quota Mentality, 2 FREEDOM AT ISSUE
10-14 (1973); Galbraith, The Galbraith Plan to Promote the Minorities, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22,
1971 (Magaine) at 9, 35, 38, 40.
5 Statistics concerning minorities are less readily available than those concerning women.
In 1972-73, black faculty members constituted only 2.9% of the total college and university
faculty in the United States. Bayer, Teaching Faculty in Academe: 1972-73, 8 ACE RES. REP.
(1973). According to the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. all minorities in 1970
constituted only 5.3% of college and university full-time faculty. VIII-3 CHRON. H. EDuc.
8 (1973). See generally, O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority
Groups to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 599, 721 (1971).
6 Although graduate school admissions have reflected the same historical discrimination,
raduate programs will be discussed herein only as they relate directly to the hiring of entry-
evel faculty members. For a table compiled by the Office of Civil Rights of HEW showing
the graduate enrollment of American Indians, blacks, Orientals and Spanish-surnamed persons
as percentages of full-time enrollment at more than 650 American institutions in the fall of
1972, see IX-11 CHRON. H. EDuc. 8-9 (1974); O'Neil, Id. at 718.
7 Hearing on Contract Compliance by Institutions of Higher Education Before the Dept.
of Labor, statement by H. Glickstein, Aug. 20, 1975, at 6. See also CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra
note 2, at 1; O'Neil, supra note 5, at 699.
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early initiatives of the federal government which dealt with this problem and
which led to the promulgation of the Guidelines.
In 1965, President Johnson proclaimed in Executive Order No. 11246,8
that as a matter of public policy "affirmative action be taken to rectify discrimi-
nation against minorities and providing that all federal contractors including
universities with research contracts, agree not to discriminate against any em-
ployee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, or national
origin." Executive Order 11375,' effective in October 1968, supplemented the
earlier order by forbidding discrimination by federal contractors on the basis of
sex. Responsibility for issuing rules, regulations and orders for implementation
and enforcement of the Executive Orders was placed with the Department of
Labor, which, under authority granted in the 1965 Executive Order, has dele-
gated its enforcement powers to the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of HEW.
Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the Department of Labor on
February 5, 1970, issued Order No. 4,1" which required each federal contractor
to develop a written affirmative action program," including specific procedures
to assure equal employment opportunity. Revised Order No. 4,12 imposing addi-
tional and more specific standards, requires that all educational institutions em-
ploying fifty or more persons and receiving $50,000 or more in federal funds sub-
mit affirmative action plans. (Regulations have been proposed changing the
limits to $100,000 and 100 or more persons.) Each plan must include numerical
goals and timetables for hiring of women and minorities (defined as Negroes,
Spanish-surnamed, American Indians and Orientals) in job classifications where
they are "under-utilized," or represented in proportions smaller than they exist in
the labor market.'" Violations of these requirements subject the institutions to
delay, denial, or cancellation of government contracts in whole or in part, and
may result in ineligibility for future contracts.' Colleges and universities are also
subject to individual and class complaints of discrimination in academic em-
ployment which may be filed with the OCR. As a general practice, OCR refers
all individual complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.'
In the first years of the federal affirmative action program, efforts were
concentrated and compliance provisions were structured primarily around the
8 Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 402-410 (1970).
9 Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. 320-321 (Supp. 1967).
10 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1971).
11 Id.
An affirmative action program is a set of specific and result-oriented procedures
to which a contractor commits himself to apply every good faith. The objective of
such efforts is equal employment opportunity. Procedures without efforts to make
them work are meaningless; and effort, undirected by specific and meaningful proce-
dures, is inadequate.
12 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1971). "An acceptable affirmative action program must include
an analysis of areas within which the contractor is inadequate." Id.
13 Id.
14 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2 (1971). Upon a finding of noncompliance, the agency must provide
the institution 30 days to show cause why penalty proceedings should not begin. Upon failure
to develop an acceptable plan or show cause for such failure within 30 days, the institution is
notified of the proposed sanction and provided a hearing.
15 See the discussion of procedures under the Executive Orders in CARNEGIE COUNCIL,
supra note 2, at 97-100.
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skilled trades.16 As government contractors, institutions of higher education were
required to provide extensive data on the number of women and minorities in
each position and to set specific goals for increasing the number of women and
minorities in each category."
The initial aim of Executive Order No. 11246 was to eliminate discrimina-
tion. But as President Johnson observed in his Howard University commence-
ment address in 1965:
You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and
liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say "you
are free to compete with all the others" and still justly believe that you
have been completely fair. Thus, it is not enough just to open the gates
of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those
gates. This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for civil
rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not just legal
equality but human ability, not just equality as a right and a theory but
equality as a fact and equality as a result."'
In 1972, this promise was still unfulfilled in academia.'"
By late 1972, the general lack of improvement in remedying academic dis-
crimination," confusion over proper jurisdiction concerning complaints of dis-
crimination,2' inconsistent and questionable interpretations by HEW's ten
regional offices, 2 and the general "inappropriateness" of Revised Order No. 4's
labor orientation23 indicated the urgent need for affirmative action guidelines
specifically applicable to higher education. HEW, the federal agency charged
with enforcement of the Executive Orders and Revised Order No. 4, responded
16 See, e.g., id. at 97; R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 64. The terms "job classification" and
"availability-utilization analysis" indicate the labor orientation of the Revised Order No. 4
provisions.
17 Universities were informed that for each category of employee in the university it would
be necessary to specify rates of remuneration and number in each category by "racial break-
down, i.e., Negro, Oriental, American Indian, Spanish-surnamed Americans. . ... This had
to be accompanied by an "Affirmative Action Program which specifically and succinctly
identiffies] problem areas by division, department location and job classification, and includes
more specific recommendations and plans for overcoming them." The Affirmative Action
Program must
include specific goals and objectives by division, department and job classification,
including target completion dates on both long and short ranges as the particular
case may indicate. Analytical provision should be made for evaluating recruitment
methods and sources; the total number of candidates interviewed, job offers made,
the numbers hired with the number of minority group persons interviewed, made
job offers and hired.
Shils, Editorial, 1971 MINERVA 165, in D. BELL, supra note 4, at 417. See also R. LESTER,
note 4, at 62-3.
18 D. BELL, supra note 4.
19 See notes 3, 5 and 6, supra.
20 An American Council on Education survey in 1973 showed that the number of women
on U.S. faculties had increased less than 1%, from 19.1% to 20% since 1968; minority group
faculty members had increased only from 2.2% to 2.9%. VIII-39 CHROX. H. EDUC. 8 (1974).
See also R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 50; Sandler, supra note 3, at 403.
21 For a chart tracing the mass of federal laws and regulations concerning sex discrimi-
nation in educational institutions in 1972, see VII-5 CHRON. H. Enuc. (1972). For a general
review of federal antibias policies, see note 2, supra.
22 See note 83, infra.
23 See CARNEGm CouNcL, supra note 2, at 124. For a critique of the same "availability
analysis" principle as incorporated in the 1972 Guidelines, see generally R. LESTER, supra
note 4, at 69-74.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
by adapting compliance provisions to fit the unique characteristics of the ap-
proximately 900 affected colleges and universities.
III. HEW's Response: The 1972 Guidelines
After repeated delays, including the issuance and limited circulation of a
100 page draft which raised strong objections from university officials,"4 HEW
issued its Guidelines in October 1972. Although they involved some modification
in deference to the special circumstances surrounding institutions of higher educa-
tion and in some instances even seemed to conflict with Revised Order No. 4, the
Guidelines appear largely to be based upon the Revised Order. The Guidelines
also adopt the Department of Labor's methodology and system for determining
numerical goals.
The Guidelines attempt to remove any ambiguity concerning the distinction
between non-discrimination and affirmative action:
"Nondiscrimination" requires the elimination of all existing discriminatory
conditions, whether purposeful or inadvertent . . . . "Affirmative action"
requires the contractor to do more than ensure employment neutrality with
regard to race, color, religion, sex, and national origin . . . .Affirmative
action requires the employer to make additional efforts to recruit, employ
and promote qualified members of groups formerly excluded, even if that
exclusion cannot be traced to particular discriminatory actions on the part
of the employer.
25
Clearly, the Guidelines recognize that preferential treatment in the selection of
faculty by race, sex, religion, or national origin constitutes discrimination pro-
hibited by law:
In the area of academic appointments, a nondiscriminatory selection process
does not mean that an institution should indulge in "reverse discrimination"
or "preferred treatment" which leads to the selection of unqualified persons
over qualified ones. Indeed to take such action on grounds of race, ethnicity,
sex or religion constitutes discrimination in violation of the Executive
Order.
26
However, they fail to clarify the conflict which exists between an even-handed
policy of absolute nondiscrimination in hiring and the requirement of "additional
efforts to recruit, employ and promote qualified members of groups formerly
excluded."
The affirmative action controversy centers on this conflict and the federal
requirement for the development of goals and timetables in affirmative action
plans. According to the Guidelines, "[g]oals are projected levels of achievement
resulting from an analysis by the contractor of its deficiencies, and of what it can
reasonably do to remedy them, given the availability of qualified minorities and
24 See R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 65.
25 37 Fcd. Reg. 24687 (1972) (Guidelines established by HEW, at 2-3).
26 Id. (Guidelines at 8).
(October 1976]
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women and the expected turnover in its work force. 21 7 Thus colleges and uni-
versities bear the responsibility for setting their own goals and timetables. The
Guidelines instruct these institutions to determine whether women and minorities
are under-utilized in any job classification28 by comparing their numbers in its
current workforce with their availability in the market from which it can
reasonably recruit. Whenever the comparison reveals that a hiring unit of the
university (a department or other section) 29 is not employing minorities and
women to the extent that they are available and qualified for work, it is then
required to set goals to overcome this situation within a reasonable time."0
While the Guidelines recognize that achievement of goals is not the sole
measure of a contractor's compliance, it does represent a primary threshold for
determining a contractor's level of performance and whether an issue of compli-
ance exists. Thus, the failure to meet goals requires a determination by the
contractor as to why the failure occurred."1
Expressly stated in the Guidelines is the admonition that "[w]hile goals are
required, quotas are neither required nor permitted by the Executive Order.""2
As further reassurance for that position, the Guidelines continue:
Nothing in the Executive Order requires that a university contractor
eliminates or dilutes standards which are necessary to the successful per-
formance of the institution's educational and research functions. The
affirmative action concept does not require that a university employ or
promote any persons who are unqualified.
3 3
Implementation and enforcement of the Guidelines are subject to a well-defined
timetable. The Department of Labor regulations, effective April 15, 1974, set
tight time limits for institutions and federal contract compliance supervisory
agencies. Within thirty days of a request, the institution must submit an affirma-
27 Id.
28 41 C.F.R. § 60.211 (1971). HEW assumes that each academic rank - professor, asso-
ciate professor, assistant professor, instructor - is a separate job classification. Department of
Labor regulations supplementing the Guidelines require that analysis of the employer's work
force include a listing of each job classification, ranked from lowest paid to highest paid within
each department, including a breakdown of any separate work units or lines of progression.
The total number of male and female job-holders must be listed for each job classification, as
well as the total number of male and female blacks, Spanish-surnamed Americans, American
Indians, and Orientals.
29 The Guidelines state that:
In many institutions the appropriate unit for goals is the school or division rather
than the department. While estimates of availability in academic employment can
best be determined on a disciplinary basis, anticipated turnover and vacancies can
usually be calculated on a wider basis. While a school, division or college may be the
organizational unit which assumes responsibility for setting and achieving goals,
departments which have traditionally excluded women or minorities from their
ranks are expected to make particular efforts to recruit, hire and promote women
and minorities. In other words, the Office for Civil Rights will be concerned
not only with whether a school meets its overall goals, but also whether apparent
general success has been achieved only by strenuous efforts on the part of a few
departments.
37 Fed. Reg. 24694, 24695 (1972).
30 "In many cases this can be accomplished within 5 years; in others more time or less
time will be required." Id. at 24694.




five action plan and detailed analysis of its labor force. The agency must then
advise the contractor within 60 days whether its plan is acceptable. If the plan
is not acceptable, the agency must notify the contractor and, within thirty days,
complete a review of the contractor's commitment to correct any deficiencies in
employment of women and minorities. If the agency determines that the plan
submitted "does not demonstrate a reasonable effort by the contractor to meet
all the requirements for such plans," the agency, without visiting the contractor,
can begin enforcement proceedings. Such proceedings include cancellation or
termination of existing contracts and declaring the contractor ineligible for
future contracts. The contractor has ten days to request a hearing. 4
Since their issuance in October 1972, the Guidelines have been interpreted
and tailored more precisely to the requirements of academia. By means of a
memorandum sent to the heads of 2800 institutions in December, 1974, Peter E.
Holmes, Director of OCR, attempted to assuage the "public furor" and "wide-
spread misapprehension" about what the federal government requires of colleges
and universities in their attempt to hire more women and members of minority
groups. Stating that "[t]he college or university, not the federal government, is
to say what constitutes qualification for any particular position,""5 Mr. Holmes
assured university officials that institutions of higher education are entitled to
hire the best qualified persons for any position "without regard to race, sex, or
ethnicity." 6 The memorandum also stressed that percentage goals for future
hiring of women and minorities were not being applied as quotas, and stated that
nowhere had his agency suspended contracts to an institution which failed to
meet its hiring goals."
Indeed, during August of 1975 the Department of Labor conducted hear-
ings for the purpose of studying the special problems encountered by universities
and colleges in developing and carrying out affirmative action programs."' As
a result of these hearings, changes in the manner of determining affirmative
action goals and timetables were expected." In fact, a temporary format for
affirmative action plans allowed institutions to include fewer statistical data and
to set some goals for faculty hiring for three-year periods rather than annually."
However, the final decision, announced by the Department of Labor in January
1976, did not change the Guidelines reporting provisions.4 '
34 41 C.F.R. §,60-2.2 (1975). See also VIII-25 CHRON. H. EDUC. 4 (1974).




38 In addition to the groups and individuals invited to testify at the hearings, a number
of college associations, including the American Council on Education and the Association of
American Universities, presented position papers, and the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies
in Higher Education released a report and recommendations on affirmative action. For the
various views considered, see Fields, Affirmative Action Changes in Offing? X-20 CHRON. H.
EDUC. 3 (1975).
39 See id.; Hicks, Federal Hearings Planned on College Hiring Policies, N.Y. Times, Aug.
18, 1975, col. 1, p. 3.
40 40 Fed. Reg. 37064 (1975). See generally X-21 CHRON. H. EDUC. 12 (1975).
41 Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 1976, at 8, col. 1.
[October 1976]
[Vol. 52:41] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER EDUCATION 49
IV. The Impact of the 1972 Guidelines
Although a survey conducted in the fall of 1972 revealed that the nation's
faculty members were almost evenly divided on whether colleges and universities
should make special efforts to recruit more women and minority group members
for their faculties,42 the Guidelines initially were met with both cautious optimism
and relief that there were no total surprises, and a general feeling that the ap-
proach was a manageable one for institutions.43 The Guidelines attempt to detail
the necessary remedial actions and their clarification that "good faith effort" to
employ more women and minorities would be considered heavily by civil rights
investigators served initially to assuage fears that the demands for hiring goals
might force colleges to set unwanted employment quotas.44
Although university faculty opinion varied concerning specific issues re-
lated to affirmative action, faculty and administrators generally were sympa-
thetic with the elimination of prejudice from faculty employment. In the 1972-
73 academic year, a national survey revealed that approximately 32 percent of
male and 42 percent of female faculty members questioned favored preferential
hiring for women, while 35 percent of the male faculty and 36 percent of the
female faculty favored preferential hiring for minority group members."
Today, after nearly four years under the Guidelines, affirmative action is
more than ever a hotly contested policy. Rather than inducing dramatic changes
in the composition of faculties, it has instead proved to be more a case study of
how difficult it is to force profound change in an institution as complex, prestigi-
ous, slow-moving, and sensitive to the economy as a college or university."
Many minority and women's leaders, affirmative action officers, and some ad-
ministrators feel that affirmative action is not producing substantially greater
hiring, retention, and promotion of women and minorities and therefore urge
more stringent federal controls on academic personnel procedures. Others would
like to eliminate the entire affirmative action effort as impossible and inappro-
priate to academia. Still others hope more money and better administration will
do the job. In short, views vary sharply as to the degree and quality of the
impact of the Guidelines."
A. Is Affirmative Action Working?
The failure of the federal effort to protect individuals from discrimination
in higher education seems to be the one issue on which commentators agree.4
42 See VII-8 CHRON. H. Enuc. 1 (1972). In that issue a survey conducted by Seymour
Martin Lipset of Harvard University and Evertt C. Ladd, Jr. of the University of Connecticut
is summarized.
43 VII-5 CHRON. H. EDuc. 2 (1972).
44 Id. at 5.
45 Bayer, supra note 5, at 30. See also Rumbarger, The Great Quota Debate and Other
Issues in Affirmative Action, in WOMEN iN HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 1, at 214.
46 See, e.g., Fields, Affirmative Action Four Years After, VIII-39 CHRON. H. EDUC. 1
(1974).
47 Id.
48 See LaNoue, Equal Opportunity Must Begin at Home, X-3 CHRON. H. Enuc. 32 (1975).
According to a recent report by the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies, "few Federal programs
are now so near to self-destruction." N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1975, at 13, col. 1. See also
Winkler, Colleges Urged to Act Now on Sex Bias, VIII-1 CHRON. H. EDuc. 9 (1973).
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Attacks on the "glacially slow" 49 progress of affirmative action at colleges and
universities have been widespread, and even the General Accounting Office
recently has acknowledged HEW's "minimal progress in making sure that col-
leges and universities have acceptable affirmative-action programs.""0 Indeed,
at least one critic has asserted that, in view of their marginal effectiveness, the
Guidelines have demonstrated themselves to be "at best irrelevant.""
As an indication of the slow start in the implementation of the affirmative
action program, a survey conducted by the American Council on Education in
1973 showed that the number of women on United States faculties had increased
less than one percent, from 19.1 to 20 percent, since issuance of Executive Order
No. 11246 in 1968.52 During the same period, minority faculty members in-
creased only from 2.2 percent to 2.9 percent.53 Although 1974 figures for
women reveal a larger increase, a report recently issued by HEW points out that
the percentage of women among all faculty on academic year contracts in 1975
remained at the 1974 level of 24 percent. 4
Women and minorities continue to be hired primarily at the lower academic
ranks,5 and statistics show that other factors equal, married men receive higher
salaries and increments than women.5" According to a 1975 survey, the per-
centage of women at the ranks of professor, associate professor, and instructor
has decreased, and the average salaries of men continue to exceed the average
salaries of women at every academic rank and at every institutional level, in both
public and private institutions.5 Even more bleak are the results of projections
by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education that women and minority
49 X-21 CHRON. H. EDUC. 12 (1975). See also Glickstein, supra note 7, at 1.
50 Id.
51 Hearing on Contract Compliance by Institutions of Higher Education Before the Dept.
of Labor, statement by M. Todorovich, Aug. 20, 1973 at 2. See also N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATrW
DISCRIMINATION at 69-70 (1975) (affirmative action procedures became institutionalized and
strengthened at a time when very substantial progress had been made, and was being made,
in the upgrading of black employment and income, a progress that had, oddly enough, taken
place without benefit of such extreme measures. "It is questionable whether they reach in any
significant way the remaining and indeed most severe problems involved in the black condition.")
52 VIII-39 CHRON. H. EDUC. 8 (1974). See also U.S. Civil Rights Commission, 3 FED.
Civ. RGTS. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 305, n. 854-56 (1974).
53 Id.
54 Phillips, Affirmative Action Programs Helping Women in Academia, Christian Science
Monitor, Mar. 8, 1975, at 23.
55 Sandier, supra note 3 at 403. See also X-16 CHRON. H. EDuc. 11 (1975); CARNEGIE
COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 24.
56 Sandler, supra note 2, at 24.
57 Phillips, supra note 54. For a table of average 1974-75 salaries for full-time faculty
members according to sex. see IX-19 CHRON. H. EDUC. 1 (1975); see also Sandler, supra
note 3, at 403; Leonard, Affirmative Action at Harvard, X-6 CHRON. H. EDUC. 13 (1975).
The average woman faculty member earns 11.4% less than would be predicted for
a man with her characteristics. Gordon, Faculty Salaries: Is There Discrimination by Sex, Race,
and Discipline?, 64 Am. EcON. REV. 419, 424-5 (1974). According to a cross-tabulation study
based on 1970 statistics of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor, a 35-year-old
woman, newly hired, white assistant professor with a Ph.D. earns $12,510, which is 3.7%
less than a corresponding man, who earns $12,990. A 30-year-old black female instructor
with a bachelor's degree and one year of seniority earns $10,280, or 23.1% less than a
comparable man who earns $13,370. A 45-year-old white female full professor in medicine
with an M.D. and ten years seniority earns $35.260 or 23.0% less than a comparable
man, who earns $45,790. Id. See also Johnson & Stafford, The Earnings and Promotion of
Women Faculty 64 Am. ECON. REv. 888 (1974). HEW statistics from the 1974-75 school
year reflect the same salary discrepancies at every teaching level. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 95 (1975).
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groups will not be represented on college and university faculties in the same
proportion as in the nation's labor force until the year 2000-and perhaps not
even by then.5"
It must be noted that affirmative action is not being universally decried as a
total failure. Some progress toward hiring and promotion of women and
minorities unquestionably has been made. Perhaps the largest gains have resulted
from publicizing the issue of bias in academia which gradually has given credence
to the notion that women and minorities really have been discriminated against
in a variety of ways.5" And opponents of the affirmative action principle, resigned
to its inevitability, no doubt are reassured by the federal government's demon-
stration that it will not make many changes very fast."
Since statistics permit little dispute over whether substantial progress has been
made, 1 the real controversy concerns the explanation for lack of progress.
Careful inquiry into problems encountered in the implementation of the present
affirmative action approach is the most obvious first step toward weighing its
impact and suggesting a direction for the future.
V. The Problems With the Implementation of the 1972 Guidelines
The following section will outline several areas of difficulty which have
arisen in the implementation of the Guidelines. The areas of difficulty to be con-
sidered are: problems of lack of good faith on the part of institutions; difficulties
of compliance and enforcement; the slackening academic job market; legal diffi-
culties and complaints of reverse discrimination; the uniqueness of the academic
labor pool and job descriptions; and certain issues which must be analyzed and
overcome in any successful plan of affirmative action.
A. Lack of Good Faith Effort
Some government officials and affirmative action activists contend that
lack of diligent effort on the part of universities accounts for affirmative action's
58 Pace Seen Slow for Women and Minorities . . . , VIII-3 CHRON. H. EDUc. 1 (1973).
The projections take into account several factors: the age distribution of current faculties,
expected attrition rates, a student-faculty ratio of 20 to 1, and projected enrollment drop in
the 1980's and pick-up in the 1990's. According to the estimates, in the 1970's 35% of the
faculty members hired by U.S. colleges and universities would be women and 10% would be
members of minority groups-enough to raise their representation by the end of this decade
to 28.1% and 7.4%, respectively. In the 1980's-with more women and minority group
members coming out of graduate schools-women would fill 45% of the openings and minor-
ities would fill 20%. By 1990 their representation would thus grow to 29.5% and 8.8%
respectively. In the 1990's-when large numbers of white males hired in the boom of the
19 60's begin to retire-55% of the openings would go to women and 25% to minorities. By
2000, that would put them at rough parity with their representation in the civilian labor force.
While this chain of events occurred, the percentage of openings going to white males would
drop from 75 in the 1960's to 58.5% in the 1970's; to 44% in the 1980's; and to 33.8% in
the 1990's. Their representation would thus decline from 76.3% in 1970 to 51.3% in 2000.
59 See Fields, supra note 46, at 1.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Lack of progress has even been acknowledged by the Director of HEW's Office for Civil
Rights. See Minority Hiring Again a Big Issue for Colleges, 77 U.S. NEws 53, 54 (1974).
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minimal achievements.6" Charging that serious, open searches and objective
selections of faculty members have failed to become the rule, advocates of this
position cite typical examples of university resistance, among them: ( 1 ) creating
a position at a lower level and hiring a pre-selected candidate, who is shortly
thereafter promoted; (2) knowingly offering a position to a minority or woman
candidate at a salary level or under conditions the candidate has already in-
dicated would be unacceptable; (3) delaying the offer until the woman or
minority candidate, with deadlines from other institutions, must withdraw from
consideration; (4) providing the appearance of "good faith" consideration by
formally listing a woman or minority candidate as the department's second
choice upon certainty that the first choice, a white male, will accept the position."
Another frequent charge is that much of the hiring and promotion of women
and minorities which have occurred under the banner of affirmative action has
been only token,64 the result of an ingrained resistance on the part of male aca-
demics to recognize the need for reform."
B. Vague and Chaotic Requirements
University administrators, on the other hand, deny accusations of bad faith,
pointing instead to such problems as vagueness in the Guidelines, unavailability
of adequate statistical data, and the great expense of implementing affirmative
action on their campuses. University officials contend that lack of good faith
may appear because institutions do not know how to locate job candidates
beyond their traditional sources of new faculty members, and are uncertain
as to what OCR expects of them. 6 Indeed, many university officials have sug-
gested that HEW clarify its "good faith" effort requirement.67 The Carnegie
Council has joined these officials in calling the affirmative action requirements
"confused and chaotic,"6  and even HEW has complained to the Department of
Labor that some of its requirements for affirmative action employment efforts at
62 The great white marshmallow of university structure is antithetical to affirmative
action .. .Throughout the nation, affirmative action offices are being demoted or
rendered ineffective as they are moved further away from the decision-making centers
within the university structure. Through policy and inaction we see a broken-down
charade acted out by HEW and the universities, accompanied by the manipulation
of data from ineptly tuned computers.
Goodwin, Playing Games With Aflirmative Action. X-10 CHRON. H. EDuc. 24 (1975).
63 Id. See also Glickstein, supra note 7, at 14.
Indeed, it has been suggested that some institutions may be seeking to fulfill their
own prophecies of doom by limiting their recruiting efforts to demonstrate the lack
of qualified women, and even go so far as to hire those who may be less qualified to
prove their predictions that the equal employment opportunity program would destroy
academic excellence.
Goldstein, Equal Employment Rights for Women in Academia, 74 TaACsr. 'COLL. REC. 395,
418 (1973).
64 Fields, supra note 46, at 8. "This is not a zealous kind of commitment, but a resignation
to do what they have to do, or do to get by." Id. at 9.
65 See notes 7 and 62, supra; see also Sape, The Use of Numerical Q2uotas to Achieve
Integration in Employment, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 481, 482 (1975).
66 Fields, supra note 46, at 9.
67 Id.
68 N.Y. Times, supra note 48.
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colleges and universities are "simply unworkable and counterproductive.""9
College administrators also point out that, until very recently, data on the
sexual and racial or ethnic characteristics of degree recipients and faculty mem-
bers were inadequate or nonexistent."0 Although data on women have improved,
those on minority groups still are inadequate. 1 Unavailability of data concerning
the labor pool has greatly hampered development of affirmative action plans. In
addition, administrators blame some of the delay on the expense of the employ-
ment analyses, which has forced many institutions to dip into their reserves, rob
fellowship funds, skew their priorities, and further increase their tuition rates."2
The Chancellor of the Berkeley campus of the University of California, for
example, estimates that compliance with affirmative action requirements cost
the University approximately $400,000 in the 1975 academic year."
C. Slow and Lax Enforcement of the Guidelines
Delay and backlogs of cases have caused persistent criticism of affinative
action administration. OCR's style of enforcement typically involves protracted
negotiations characterized by extreme reluctance to impose any penalty beyond
delay in awarding of contracts or allocation of funds. 4 As of August, 1974, of
the approximately 1000 schools covered by the Guidelines, HEW's Higher
Education Division had found only 13 campuses in compliance with the Guide-
lines; over 700 schools had not even submitted plans.7 From December 1969
to January 1974, a total of only twenty universities are recorded as having had
a temporary block imposed on new contracts or renewals." In May 1975, the
General Accounting Office reported the "almost non-existence of enforcement
action" by government agencies charged with contract compliance." Although
OCR warned 29 universities in June 1975 that it might withhold their pending
federal contracts unless acceptable affirmative action plans were quickly forth-
coming,' the resolution of that threat pleased no one. Since OCR lacked time
to conduct a thorough compliance review before the fiscal year ended on June
30, it strongly suggested that the institutions sign a model agreement largely
69 The charge was contained in a statement filed by HEW at the opening of public hear-
ings on implementation of affirmative action by colleges and universities in August, 1975. In
one of his last acts as secretary of HEW, Caspar W. Weinberger supported administrators in
complaining that the lengthy and detailed employment analyses required of colleges and uni-
versities, "coupled with a requirement for non-entry-level goals and timetables, are an un-
reasonable and burdensome requirement." X-21 'CHRON. H. EDUC. 12 (1975).
70 CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 47-48; Todorovich, supra note 51, at 9.
71 Fields, supra note 46 at 8; CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 25-26.
72 The High Cost of Compliance, X-18 CHRON. H. EDUC. 1 (1975). Several witnesses
before the 1975 Department of Labor hearings urged that all federal grants and contracts
awarded to institutions of higher education include, along with administrative costs, a specified
percentage to offset the costs of administering the campus affirmative action program. X-21
CHRON. H. Ennc. 12 (1975). See generally CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 168-73.
73 Johnson, It's Action, But Is It Affirmative?, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1975 (Magazine)
at 18.
74 CARNEGIE CouNcL, supra note 2, at 155. See R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 109.
75 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, III FED. Civ. RoTs. ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 303
(1974).
76 See R. LESTER, supra note 4 at 4.
77 N.Y. Times, May 5, 1975, at 1, col. 3; see R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 107-9.
78 Fields, 29 Universities Warned U.S. May Withhold Contracts, CHRON. H. EDUC.
(1975).
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based upon the plan recently negotiated with the University of California at
Berkeley. 9 After hasty negotiations, 13 universities signed a short agreement with
OCR.80
As a result of its spotty performance record, "the government's stiffest civil-
rights stick"-the threat to withhold federal contracts-"is becoming a comic
foam rubber club," and most commentators agree that the performance of OCR
probably has been a major factor in the failure of affirmative action to make
wider gains.8 ' The agency itself admits that it was not prepared to begin en-
forcing the ban on discrimination, and its director cites the absence of adequate
79 Id. The Berkeley Plan, approved on February 18, 1975, and hailed as the most far-
reaching ever achieved, provides that the University of California's Berkeley campus will elim-
inate discriminatory hiring practices during the next 30 years by filling at least 100 faculty
positions with women and minorities. Defining "under-utilization" as the "numerical disparity
between the number of women or ethnic minorities employed and the number that could be
expected, based on the percentage of women and ethnic minorities available," (University of
California, I Berkeley Affirmative Action Program and Related Documents at 1), the Plan in-
cludes a utilization analysis of "ladder rank faculty" for each department where 1.0 hires or
more are necessary to reach parity with the relevant availability pool. Goals have been set for 31
of 75 departments and units in the case of women, one department in the case of blacks, two
departments in the case of Asians, and no department in the cases of Spanish-surnamed Ameri-
cans or American Indians. Id. The Plan further set goals for promotion of women and minor-
ities to the associate professor and full professor ranks in proportion to those eligible for
promotion within each department and based upon the individual qualifications of each can-
didate. The Berkeley campus will submit yearly reports to HEW and revised goals and time-
tables will be formulated as required by changes in availability data, turnover rate, or new
hirings. Id. at 2. No goal is set for increasing the supply of qualified candidates.
To develop availability data for the Plan, each University job title was reviewed to deter-
mine the census detailed or intermediate occupation which most closely reflected the job duties
or prerequisite skills or qualifications. By subcategory and title code, the number of positions
was then determined and compared to the qualified work force of census detailed occupations.
This system revealed that most departments do not seriously underrepresent women or minor-
ities, since, for example, there are very few women with degrees in forestry, blacks with Ph.D.'s
in classics, or Orientals with degrees in Spanish.
As a result of the departmental goals - set only for those departments which need to
hire one or more persons and not, for example, in departments such as civil engineering which
needs .19 women to achieve parity with the availability pool - 31 departments over the next
30 years must hire a total of 95.71 women; the social welfare department must hire 1.38
black faculty members; and civil engineering and architecture need to hire 1.39 Orientals.
These results, not surprisingly, have met charges of tampered availability pools from affirmative
action advocates, and may tend to support university administrators who claim that affirmative
action is much ado about nothing. For an excellent summary of the Berkeley Plan and the
response to it, see Johnson, supra note 72. See also CARNEGIE CouncxL, supra note 2, at 155;
Fields, supra note 46, at 3.
80 Universities Given Revised Agreement Form for Contracts, Higher Education Daily,
June 27, 1975; Universities Sign OCR Pact; Will Get Contracts, Higher Education Daily,
July 1, 1975. See CARNEGIE CouNcIL, supra note 2, at 127-8.
81 All Sides Criticize Law Barring Job Bias by Federal Contractors, Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 14, 1975 at 1. In fact, OCR's policy is to refrain from declaring a contractor in non-
compliance without extensive evidence in a formal hearing. No formal hearing has ever been
held, and show-cause orders are exceedingly rare. U.S. CoMMIssION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 74, at 278. See CARNEGIE COuNciL, supra note 2, at 115. N. GLAZER, AFIZMMATIvE
DISCasMINATION (1975):
[Tihe Federal government and its agencies engaged in the fight against discrimination
-the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of Labor, with its
branches spread through every government agency; the Department of Justice; the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created. by the Civil Rights Act of
1964 - are regularly denounced for inefficiency, lack of good faith, incompetence,
and refusal to carry out the law. Some of the agencies of government regularly de-
nounce others. Thus, the EEOC criticizes agencies engaged in signing contract com-
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statistical data as a major obstacle. 2 OCR's uneven enforcement efforts,
however, marked by uncertainty and sometimes excessive demands from federal
investigators of various agencies, created hard feelings among some institutions
and prompted complaints which continue today. Many observers of the en-
forcement program comment upon the inadequacy of the agency's staff in re-
lation to the size and complexity of the enforcement problem,83 and the variation
in policies followed between EHEW's ten regions.84 Many academics feel that the
government investigators "are poorly trained and seem to have little knowledge
or understanding of higher education."8 " Critics of OCR's administration also
cite instances in which officials were "self-righteous, abrupt, preachy, and even
arrogant" when reviewing colleges' compliance with affirmative action require-
ments."6
Other persistent complaints involve the proliferation of government agencies
enforcing antidiscrimination and the inappropriateness of the sanctions provided.
The financial problems encountered by a university, which is simultaneously
involved in negotiations with several agencies, can be great indeed, 7 and may be
further complicated by the threat of withholding federal contracts. As the
Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education points out, withholding
of research funds would in many cases result in layoffs of nontenured personnel,
as well as the restriction of training opportunities for advanced graduate stu-
dents.88 Withdrawal of funds may also unfairly penalize particular research
groups when "under-utilization" exists in unrelated teaching departments, 9
and ironically may deprive the government of a research service which the
offending institution was uniquely qualified to provide." Some critics of this
sanction argue, as OCR policy seems to indicate, that the severity of the
penalties is responsible for OCR's reluctance to vigorously prosecute violations."
D. Shrinking Academic Job Market
Undoubtedly, the affirmative action effort has been hindered by the fact
82 Dr. Mary Lepper has explained:
A lot of the kinds of mechanical data we're getting on top of this year, but it has
made it appear, unfortunately, to our clientele that we weren't serving them. What
they haven't realized is that because the program had drifted, we finally just had to
call a halt, and find where we were, and get some data. There just was no point in
continuing to go out to the universities and say, 'Do this, this, and this' if those
things weren't feasible.
Fields, supra note 46, at 8.
83 CARNEGm COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 151; Murray, supra note 3, at 5660; R. LESTER,
supra note 4, at 105.
84 CARNEGIE COUNciL, supra note 2; R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 103, Wall Street Journal,
supra note 80.
85 Vetter, Affirmative Action in Faculty Employment Under Executive Order 11246,
quoted in CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 150; R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 103, 107.
86 Todorovich, supra note 51, at 2; Colleges Faulted on Discrimination, Wall Street Jour-
nal, Aug. 11, 1975, at 13, col. 3; X-21 CHRON. H. EDUC. 12 (1975).
87 See notes 21, 73, supra; CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 159; R.. LESTER, supra
note 4, at 6.
88 CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 177-8; see also Goldstein, supra note 63, at 421.
89 CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 178.
90 Id. at 177.
91 See note 81, supra.
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that, just as it began, the bottom fell out of the academic job market." In the
current no-growth era of academia," faculty vacancies must arise largely from
turnover, not from expansion, and turnovers do not occur quickly enough to
satisfy the goals and timetables demanded by current "under-utilization." Many
academic administrators contend that they have very few open positions in
relation to the number of applicants and, consequently, they are able to hire
almost no one, whether male, female, or minority.
Further complicating this problem is academia's most distinctive and, in
times of tight market, most preciously cherished personnel practice-tenure.
Once awarded tenure, a faculty member typically remains at that institution
until retirement or voluntary resignation. Tenure, therefore, significantly limits
turnover.9 4 Compliance with affirmative action regulations may require termi-
nating, or at least drastically transforming, tenure provisions. Undoubtedly, this
will provoke widespread opposition in academia.
E. Emphasis on Quotas Instead of Equal Opportunity
Another major controversy touches on the distinction between "goals" and
"quotas." The charge is made that the federal enforcement agencies, with their
scheme of affirmative action based on an estimate of "under-utilization," are
attempting to require employment of women and minorities in proportion to
their presence in the population. This is evidenced by the emphasis on statistics
rather than on discrimination and equal opportunity." According to these
critics, "affirmative action" originally imposed a duty not to discriminate and a
requirement to seek out candidates who might not otherwise apply for available
positions.96 Since the Department of Labor and the Guidelines impose strict
requirements and threat of sanctions upon all federal contractors, however, their
effect is to assume, without individual proof, that everyone is guilty of dis-
crimination.9" Since actual discrimination is difficult to prove, the test applied
is whether favored groups exist at every level of the faculty in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population. The remedy prescribed is the setting of
numerical goals and dates for reaching them, and the application of an undefined
"good faith effort" test if the goal is not met.98 The effect of this procedure,
92 See Fields, supra note 46, at 1; Glickstein & Todorovich, Discrimination in Higher
Education: A Debate on Faculty Employment, 7 Civ. RGTS. DIGEST 3, 19 (1975).
93 See note 2, supra.
94 In 1972, colleges and universities with tenure systems, (85% of the total) had a
median of 41% to 50% of their faculties on tenure. In the spring of 1971, 42% of
the respondents to a national survey awarded tenure to all eligible faculty members,
and two-thirds awarded tenure to 75% or more of those under consideration.
At this rate, many schools will soon have faculties 'solidified' by a very high propor-
tion of tenured personnel.
Chait & Ford, Can a College Have Tenure and Affirmative Action, Too?. VIII-2 CHRON. H.
EDUC. 16 (1973).
95 "fElqual opportunity, not even statistical distribution, is the proper objective of public
policy." N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 169, 66-7; D. BELL, supra note 4, at 417; R. LESTER,
supra note 4, at 91-2.
96 N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 58. Glazer traces the history of affirmative action since
the Executive Order, and contrasts the "new concept" with the sanctions employed by the
1964 Civil Rights Act to punish only those employers found guilty of discrimination.
97 N. GLAZER, supra note 81; Glickstein & Todorovich, supra note 92, at 7.
98 See D. BELL, supra note 4; N. GLAZER, supra note 95.
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claim the critics, is to change the affirmative action principle from nondis-
crimination, the goal for which it was devised, to proportional representation.
It is alleged that the concept of affirmative action ignores individual freedom,
by creating a right to employment for women and minorities in proportion to
their numbers and rewards group attribute instead of individual achievement. 9
As Nathan Glazer asserts, the emphasis has moved "from equal opportunity to
statistical parity."
100
In recommending the abolition of goals and timetables, some commentators
point to their tremendous potential for harm. First is the accusation that the
utilization analysis use by department tends to inflate numerical goalsz01 and thus
manifests the demand for women and minorities and the extent of the deficiency
when a university cannot meet its goal. Second, in spite of the mere "good faith"
requirement, from the employer's point of view the simplest way of avoiding loss
of federal contracts is simply to meet the goals by any means 1°2 regardless of the
consequent hardships to non-favored groups. Thus, in practice the distinction
between goals and quotas often blurs considerably,"' prompting the insistence
of some critics that getting the proportions right is not the same thing as non-
discrimination.
In response to these charges, supporters of goals and timetables insist that
their abandonment would immeasurably weaken affirmative action efforts on
many campuses. Additionally, they argue that in civil rights proceedings, where
numerical ratios traditionally are sufficient to evoke an inference of discrimina-
tion, such ratios are properly considered appropriate measures of relief. 4 In
discrimination matters, the concern is necessarily with the result of the operation,
and in cases of wholesale discrimination, determination of an appropriate result
99 "EGlroups become the basis for rights, and those who want to claim certain rights must
do so as a member of an affected or protected class." N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 75. See
also D. BELL, supra note 4, at 419; Shanker, Where We Stand, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975,
at 9 (quoting Congressman James O'Hara).
100 N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 33-76. Several dozen prominent university professors have
called on President Ford to "end the numbers games played by Government administrators."
Quotas Assailed in Faculty Hiring, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1975, at 47, col. 1.
The "numerical goals" and "precise timetables" were created because they looked
like the most convenient bureaucratic solution. The officials would not have to make
the moral decisions involved in a finding of discrimination ... all they would have to
do would be to check off numbers on a list and think up requirements for others to
fulfill.
Todorovich, supra note 51, at 33.
101 Where the numbers of faculty in a department are so small that the "under-utilized"
figure is only a fraction, the tendency is to round the figure to one. R. LESTER, supra note 4.
at 79; see also 8 HARv. Civ. Rors. L. REv. 128, 139 (1973).
102 N. GL.AZER, supra note 81, at 49; Goldstein, Affirmative Action: Equal Employment
for Women in Academia, 74 TEACH COLL. REC. 395, 415, 421 (1973).
103 Indications of the goal/quota confusion abound: Attorney General Edward Levi was
quoted as saying that hiring goals are really quotas: "What we have done is to assure our-
selves that we are against quotas . . . and if we call them goals and swallow hard or stop
thinking . . . then it's okay." X-20 CHRON. H. EDuc. 3 (1975); see also, Shanker, supra note
99; Quotas Assailed in Faculty Hiring, supra note 100. Senator James L. Buckley (R. N.Y.)
has announced that he will seek legislation to bar the federal government from imposing em-
ployment quotas. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1976, p. 25, col. 1. For arguments against goals and
timetables, see Hook, On Discrimination: Part 1 in Naw DIRECaroNs FOR INSTITUTIONAL
RE EARCH: TowARD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (L. Selle ed. 1974). Seabury, HEW and thle
Universities, 53 COMMENTARY 38-44 (1972).
104 The Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education recommends retention of
goals and timetables in affirmative action plans, but specifies that timetables should be set for
periods not exceeding five to ten years. CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 146-7.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
necessarily must resort to statistics."' While no minority group has an absolute
right to be represented in a particular faculty, such persons are entitled to an
equal opportunity of access, and statistics are a valid means of showing whether
that opportunity has been provided." 0 Thus, according to this viewpoint, the
establishment of goals and timetables avoids reliance solely upon the ill-defined
duty not to discriminate,0 ' and should be considered as a management informa-
tion device to allow both the colleges and the regulatory agency to monitor more
effectively and evaluate the progress being made toward equal employment op-
portunity."'
Advocates of the use of goals stress that they are significantly different from
the traditional concept of quotas, and point out that quotas are prohibited by
the language of the Guidelines.0 9 The distinction is drawn that:
Quota systems keep people out; goals are targets for inclusion of people
previously excluded. Goals are an attempt to estimate what an employer's
work force would look like if there was no illegal discrimination based on
race or sex. No institution is required to hire women or minorities on the
basis of sexual or racial preference." 0
Further, the obligation to meet the goal is not absolute; the employer's com-
pliance is not evaluated solely on the basis of whether it achieves its goals. On
105 The United States Supreme Court has held that intent to discriminate or not discrimi-
nate is irrelevant, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). It is now well accepted
that a statistical showing of under-representation is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. The courts have permitted statistics to point out the wrong and guide the
remedy in areas as diverse as school desegregation, jury selection, and industrial employment
quotas. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (using statistical data to establish
prima facie case of discrimination); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg School Bd., 402 U.S.
1, 8 (1971) (involving statistics to achieve racial balance in public schools); NAACP v. Allen,
340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (upholding a requirement for hiring one qualified black
state trooper or support person for each white hired until the force reached 25% black) ; Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (approving a plan
requiring one-third of future hiring to be from minority applicants); Associated General
Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. AIschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 957 (1974); (upholding racial criteria imposed on bidders for state contracts); Con-
tractor's Ass'n. of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971) (upholding Philadelphia Plan for annually increased manpower litigation
goals to raise minority employment in construction trades). Thus, while quotas merely to
attain racial balance may be forbidden by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have made
clear that quotas or other statistical remedies to correct past discrimination are not. See also
United States v. Metal Lathers Internat'l Union No. 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973). For other examples of result-orientcd relief, see Carter v. Greene County
Jury Comm'n., 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); United States
ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962); Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 698 (5th
Cir. 1966) (en banc); United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964);
Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
106 See note 105, supra. See also 8 HARv. Civ. RGTs. L. RPv. at 135; Sape, supra note 65, at
490-92.
107 Sape, supra note 65, at 136. It is further explained that goals are aligned with the
number of qualified women and minorities available in the academic labor pool and not in
terms of their general representation in the population. Sandier, supra note 3, at 404.
108 Without external guidelines by which both the party in question and supervisory
organizations may gauge their efforts, even well-intentioned non-discrimination may
be barely distinguishable in result from continuing discrimination. Moreover, objecti-
fying the enforcement standards reduces possibilities of purposeful evasion or abuse.
Sape, supra note 65, at 137; see also Goldstein, supra note 102, at 415.
109 37 F. Reg. 24687 (1972). See notes 25, 32, 37, supra; Goldstein, supra note 102;
Sandier, supra note 3, at 404; Glickstein, supra note 7, at 13.
110 Sandier, supra note 3.
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-the contrary, the only requirement is the demonstration of good faith efforts."'
Far from pushing universities into precise achievement of quotas, some observers
assert, HEW has been tolerant to the point of indifference,1 2 and the timetables
have been generous indeed. The Berkeley plan, for example, provides a period of
30 years for achieving its goals.1 3 If there are changes to be made, these com-
mentators contend that they should be to strengthen the government enforcement
effort, not to abolish goals and timetables.
F. Reverse Discrimination
Despite government assurances that affirmative action does not mean that
universities must give "preferential treatment" to women and minorities in
faculty hiring, a substantial backlash seems to be developing among white male
academics, who charge that university commitment to goals leads inevitably to
discrimination against non-favored individuals." 4 These critics cite instances in
which white male candidates were rejected on the grounds that "all unfilled
positions in the University must be filled by blacks or females,""' 5 and black
faculty members were offered appointments at salaries well above those for whites
with equivalent or better qualifications." 6 Some critics assert that affirmative
action programs attempt to remedy discrimination by rekindling discrimination,
placing an unfair burden on those who are thereby excluded. Such reverse
discrimination, it is claimed, raises not only a moral," 7 but a legal issue, since
111 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.13. See Sandler, supra note 3, at 405; Goldstein, supra note 101, at
415. The concept of "good faith effort," however, admittedly presents troublesome problems
of enforcement. Rather than defining the term "good faith," the 1974 memorandum to college
and university presidents from Peter E. Holmes, Director of OCR, provided several illustrations
of bad faith. See note 35, supra. Reference to the requirement of "good faith" in other areas
of the law reveals that the term's commonly understood meaning involves "honesty of purpose
or intention," "freedom from intention to defraud," and "faithfulness to one's duty or obliga-
tion." See, e.g., Long Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 189
F. Supp. 589, 611, 612 (S.D. Cal. 1960); In re Pine Grove Canning Co., 226 F. Supp. 872,
877 (W.D. La. 1963); Drum v. Scott, 337 F. Supp. 588, 590 (M.D.N.C. 1972); People v.
Bowman, 156 Cal. App. 2d 784, 320 P.2d 70, 76 (1958); Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397,
189 A.2d 15, 19 (1963); Doyle v. Gordon, 158 N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (1954). See also
the provisions regarding good faith in contract interpretation, arbitration, and satisfaction
clauses, requiring "absence of fraud" and dissatisfaction "honestly entertained." 17A C.J.S.
Contracts §§ 318, 498(1), 495 (1963). Under the Uniform Commercial Code the test of good
faith is "honesty in fact." For purposes of the federal in forma pauperis statute, good faith is
judged by an objective standard, and if an appeal is frivolous it is deemed not taken in good
faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1961); Meyer v. State of New York, 344
F. Supp. 1377, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Thus, though necessarily abstract, precedent does exist
for measuring a "good faith effort" of affirmative action compliance.
112 "Far from having been pushed so hard that they become quotas, goals have been soft-
pedalled to the point of becoming rhetorical declarations of intent rather than yardsticks of
achievement." Glickstein, supra note 7, at 13.
113 See note 79, supra; Glickstein, supra note 7, at 6; CARNEGE COUNCI, supra note 2,
at 139-40.
114 See N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 60-63, 169-195; R. LESTER. supra note 4, at 90; Van
Dyne, Colleges' White Men Assail 'Preference' for Minorities, VII-18 CHRON. H. EDUC. 4
(1973); Todorovich, supra note 51, at 15, 20. See generally, Flaherty & Sheard, DeFunis, The
Equal Protection Dilemma: Afirmative Action and Quotas, 12 Dupu-sxz L. Rnv. 745, 763
(1974); Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admissions: A jurisprudential Approach,
75 COLUm. L. Rav. 534, 544 (1975); Reverse Discrimination: Has It Gone Too Far?, U.S.
News, March 29, 1976, at 26.
115 N. GLAZER, supra note 51, at 16-19, 60-61; See Todorovich, supra note 51, at 16-19;
U.S. News, supra note 114.
116 See R. LEsTER, supra note 4, at 49; Todorovich, supra note 51, at 20.
117 N. GLAZER, supra note 51, at 205-210; Flaherty & Sheard, supra note 114, at 763.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
under the fifth and 14th amendments to the Constitution, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,118 as well as the language of the Guidelines and regulations them-
selves, any system of giving preference to individuals because of their race or sex
is unconstitutional.119 If the law condemns the original discrimination against
women and minorities because it was based on an irrelevant characteristic, surely
it is inconsistent to advocate a policy which awards benefits on the basis of those
same group characteristics.
Although the United States Supreme Court has declined an opportunity to
decide the reverse discrimination issue in the context of law school admissions,
Justice Douglas' dissent in that case, DeFunis v. Odegaard,"2 ' appeared to rein-
force the argument for total "color-blindness":
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred... There is no
superior person by constitutional standards, a DeFunis who is white is
entitled to no advantage by reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any
disability, no matter his race or color.
121
By suggesting the abolition of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) and the
invention of substitute tests to measure an applicant's cultural background,
perception, ability to analyze, and relation to groups, however, the dissent cer-
tainly seemed to recognize the need for alteration of existing institutional stan-
dards which operate to exclude minorities."2 The Supreme Court's inaction in
DeFunis, and the possible import of Justice Douglas' dissent, coupled with the
issue's extreme controversiality, assure that another confrontation before the
Supreme Court is virtually inevitable.
123
Another potential issue of reverse discrimination centers around the identi-
fication of the groups for which affirmative action must be employed. Some
critics complain that the goal of nondiscrimination is not always apparent from
the criteria selected, and charges of preference and growing resentment between
118 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
119 See N. GLAZER, supra note 51, at 196; Sape, supra note 65, at 485; 8 HAv. Civ. RGTS.
L. REv. 128 (1973) at 174; Glickstein & Todorovich supra note 91, at 6. See also Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
120 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In 1970, the University of Washington Law School rejected the
application of a white, male, Jewish student named Marco DeFunis although his undergraduate
grades and test scores would have warranted admission had he been black, Chicano, American
Indian, or Oriental. Contending that the law school's procedure of considering minority appli-
cations separately and by less stringent criteria operated to discriminate against him, a lower
state court granted DeFunis a temporary restraining order compelling his admission to the
law school. Although the Washington Supreme Court upheld the law school's admission policy
and reversed the lower court, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 407 P.2d 1169, 1176
(1973), DeFunis had nearly completed law school when the case reached the United States
Supreme Court. On that basis, a majority of the Court held the issue moot and refused to
consider the merits of the case.
121 416 U.S. 337-38 (1974).
122 Id. at 344.
123 See Lubasch, Race Quota for Principals Voided by U.S. Court Here, N.Y. Times, Jan.
20, 1976, p. 1, col. 3, reporting the reversal of a court-ordered quota for school principals as
constitutionally forbidden reverse discrimination in Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 44 U.S.L.W.
2343 (1976). See also, Oelsner, Reverse Bias: A New Injustice?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1976,
at 7, col. 1; Fields, Reverse Discrimination: A Classic DeFunis case coming in Illinois, X-1
CHRON. H. EDUC. 6 (1975). See generally, Nickel, supra note 114. For a discussion of pref-
erential admissions policies and the Constitution, see O'Neil, supra note 6, at 705-740.
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minority groups have been voiced since the issuance of the Guidelines."'
Critics question the basis on which the "preferred" groups were selected;
why was the principle extended only to Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, American
Indians, Filipinos, Chinese and Japanese?.. 5 Why not to Jews, Italians, Irish,
and other ethnic groups? And why not religious or political beliefs as the criteria?
Does the non-Spanish-surnamed wife of a Spanish-surnamed American qualify
for preference on grounds of ethnicity by marriage?
There is also the effect of geographical location. The Japanese, for example,
may be a recognized minority in California, but not in Hawaii.'26 Clearly, these
classifications raise difficult questions, involving issues of both over and under-




Responses to the issue of reverse discrimination range from outright denial
to admission that in some instances the charges are justified. 2 Some observers
claim that if preferences were being afforded to women and minorities, they
would be revealed in statistics-which they are not.'29 The Guidelines and regu-
lations clearly do not require a preference, but many activists assert that even if
preferences are being employed, they are not necessarily discriminatory. True, as
they begin to be treated more fairly, women and minorities are an economic
threat to white males. Some of these men who would otherwise have been hired
if women and minorities were kept out will now be turned down because they
are not as well qualified as the women and minorities hired.' That is not reverse
discrimination.
124 Now it appears that the affirmative action concept has been completely distorted to
the point where it constitutes preferential treatment to such an extent as to be totally
discriminatory. It discriminates against one minority group in favor of another ...
and has become a serious concern, not only to the Jewish community which seems
most significantly affected, but to all who have always held to the belief that dis-
crimination must be fought where and whenever it appears ....
Biaggo, supra note 4. See also Watkins, Will it Be Blacks vs. Women for Faculty Jobs?, VIII-5
CHRON. H. EDUC. 1 (1973); N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 75; Seabury, supra note 103, at
38-44. But see N. GLAZER, supra note 81, at 186; Race Quotas, supra note 101, at 173.
125 See D. BELL, supra note 4, at 418-19. "Most immigrant groups have had periods in
which they were discriminated against. For the Irish and the Jews, for example, these periods
lasted a long time. Nor is it the case that all the groups that are now recorded as deserving
official protection have suffered discrimination, or in the same way." N. GLAZER, supra note
51 at 198. Glazer concludes that:
clearly these guidelines have been issued less because of a powerful need or demand
of these groups for redress (though what is asserted is undoubtedly true) than because
either these groups must have decided they needed protection for themselves owing
to the preferred position that other groups are attaining or because equity seemed
to demand of the guideline-setters that they be included, too. Thus groups that were
once content to press their advantage through education, business, informal pressures,
and specific complaints because of discrimination to state and federal agencies may
find, in self-defense or the desire not to lose an advantage, that they, too, must enter
the arena of conflict that the government has defined....
Id. at 75.
126 See Flaherty & Sheard, supra note 114, at 763.
127 See Nickel, supra note 114, at 555-7; Alexander & Alexander, The New Racism: An
Analysis of the Use of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in Decision-Making 9 S'.s' Dmoo L. REv. 190
(1972) ; see generally, supra note 5, at 747-751; B. BiTTrER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPAATi N
93-101 (1973).
128 Sandler, supra note 3, at 407: "Some administrators have misunderstood the federal
requirements and have erroneously believed that only women and minorities, including minority
women, could be hired. HEW in the past has played a major role in such misconceptions...
129 Sandler, supra note 3, at 402-3, 418.
130 Id. at 407. "It is impossible to know what our society would be like today if unalloyed
personal preference had been allowed full sway after slavery had been abolished." B. BITTKER,
supra note 127, at 25. See Goldstein, supra note 102, at 416-418.
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It is also argued that the reverse discrimination objection fails to grasp the
very purpose of the law's responsibility to "so far as possible, eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future." '' The courts, the Congress, and government agencies have recognized
that it simply is not possible to achieve equality and fairness by applying neutral
principles, and have reluctantly accepted the notion that perhaps we must
tolerate temporary, short-range disadvantages for white males in order to over-
come our racist and sexist past. Viewed as a matter of justice, the preference
satisfies the recipient's right to compensation for past injustice; viewed as a
matter of utility, perhaps the public good can be promoted by distributing fair
shares."' Viewed in a constitutional context, the preference is ameliorative
rather than invidious, and must meet only the test of rational relation to a
legitimate state objective."' In remedying discrimination, therefore, some argue
that it is permissible to be color-conscious in order to become color-blind."'
G. Uniqueness of the University
Critics of affirmative action point to the special problems the Guidelines
present for institutions of higher education which, it is claimed, in order to serve
as centers for the advanced study of human affairs and critical evaluation of
society, must enjoy a large measure of autonomy, academic specialization, and
appointment on the basis of merit. Because universities are unique among
federal contractors, it is felt that federal requirements should be more specifically
tailored to their needs.
First, university administrators are concerned about the subtle changes in
the structure of university decision-making which federal requirements may
force. Commenting on the "parallel affirmative action bureaucracy" now com-
mon on university campuses, administrators bemoan the "heavy bureaucratiza-
tion of the process of higher education as a result of federal interference."'3s
131 8 HARv. Civ. RGTS. L. Rev. at 169. It is indeed ironic that a country that used racial
classifications for many years should be wary of preserving or reviving them in a program of
reparations. See B. BITTxER, supra note 127, at 98; see generally B. BITTKER, at 108-127.
132 Nickel, supra note 114, at 544; see 8 HARv. Civ. RoTS. L. Rev. at 163; see generally B.
BITTKER, supra note 127, at 22, 128-137.
133 Id. at 175-177; Sandier, supra note 3, at 404; Sape, supra note 65, at 504-5. Precedent
for the use of preferential policies in the United States may be found in the special educational
and employment opportunities for veterans. Although undoubtedly, many non-veterans have felt
disadvantaged by such preferences, the sacrifices made by veterans, as a group, have justified
their group preference. See Nickel, supra note 114, at 534, 546, 548-9; Glickstein & Todorovich,
supra note 92, at 15; House Comm'n. on Veterans' Affairs, Provision of Federal Benefits for
Veterans, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 258-65 (1955); The Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 5
U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309, 3310 (1972).
134 For example, in justifying the establishment of a priority pool comprised entirely of
blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit said:
The goal of color blindness, so important to our society in the long run, does not
mean looking at the world through glasses that see no color; it means only that all
colors are moral equivalents, to be treated on an equal basis. We believe that our
society is well served by taking into account color in the fashion used, and carefully
limited in extent and duration....
NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027 (1st Cir. 1974). See also 8 HARv. Civ. RoTs. L. Rxv.
at 131
135 Todorovich, supra note 51, at 22-3; see also Fields, supra note 46, at 9; Goldstein,
supra note 63, at 418. R. LESTER supra note 4, at 126-132.
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Government programs of antidiscrimination enforcement designed for an in-




Supporters of affirmative action respond that these complaints under the
guise of academic freedom and autonomy have become a "smokescreen" to
obscure the basic issues. 37 The government does not attempt to hamper uni-
versity governance and decision-making other than to require that such decisions
are made on a nondiscriminatory basis. No specific procedures for hiring and
promotion are imposed upon institutions by any government regulations."'
The argument that the "industrial model" of the Guidelines is ill-suited for
academia fails to recognize that the affirmative action concept is derived not
solely from industry, but from statutes, legislative histories, the United States
Constitution, and countless judicial decisions. Affirmative action, in any context,
is based on equity, and colleges and universities which benefit from large amounts
of government support should be able to abide by the same reasonable require-
ments for the utilization of public funds as do private contractors."' 8
Another problem claimed to be particularly acute in academia is the alleged
need to take special factors into account in dealing with utilization analysis for
determining goals and timetables. College and university officials contend that
the low number of women and minority faculty members is due to the lack of
an adequate pool of qualified individuals to hire. 4 ' Where such shortages of
supply exist, it is claimed that the existing affirmative action programs only result
in re-shuffling of minorities and women as universities try desperately to meet their
goals. " " For tenure level faculty particularly, university administrators argue
that qualified supply must be defined in even more individual terms, based on
reputation as a teacher-scholar and the particular university department's needs
over the projected period of tenureship.
1 42
In addition, unlike other federal contractors, universities possess the unique
ability to control through undergraduate and graduate admissions their own
supply. Ignoring this fact, the Guidelines assume that most of the responsibility
136 R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 121, 126. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 228.
137 Sandier, supra note 3, at 408.
138 Id.
139 Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 63, at 419.
140 See College Hiring Practices Should Be Free From U.S. Nonbias Rule, Hearing is Told,
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21, 1975, at 8, col. 1. See also R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 34;
Fields, supra note 46, at 9; Sandier, supra note 3, at 411; Todorovich, supra note 51, at 8. 11,
26. A Carnegie Council study appears to bear out the claim that progress is being made to
the extent of the available supply. While non-minority women constitute 16 to 17% of the
pool of "qualified persons." They hold 18% tenure track faculty positions in four-year colleges
and universities, and minorities represent 4 to 5% in both pool and faculty categories.
CARNEGIE COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 5; see generally O'Neil, supra note 5, at 759.
141 "You're not gaining a lot reallocating pools of less than one percent," Martin H. Gerry,
Acting Director of HEW's Office for Civil Rights, was quoted in the N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1975, at 26. In some cases, limited supply is an extreme reality. According to a recent Carnegie
Council study, only about four percent of the doctoral degrees required for tenured positions
in colleges and universities are currently held by members of non-female groups. Id. See generally
O'Neil, supra note 5. at 722 for a discussion of such "re-shuffling" of minority matriculants.
Although women hold approximately 40% of the doctorates in English, less than half of one
percent of the Ph.D. degrees in engineering are held by women. R. LESTER, supra note 4, at
34. For a table showing percentages of Ph.D.'s granted between 1920 and 1972 that were
received by women, see id. at 37.
142 Id. at 35, 49, 77.
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for race or sex bias in faculties rests on the demand side and concentrate on
means to achieve certain quantities of appointments and promotions for women
and minorities. At least one critic of affirmative action has suggested implemen-
tation of goals for the supply side, a credit for universities achieving success in
expanding the qualified supply.14
In response, critics of university policies assert that supply shortages result at
least in part from past and existing discrimination in academic admissions and,
therefore, pressure on universities should not be lessened merely because at long
last they take steps to relieve the shortage. Many activists charge that by concen-
trating on the "supply" argument, academics divert attention from those minor-
ities and women who are already qualified and discriminated against. 44 Affirma-
tive action advocates also contend that the limited supply complaint results
largely from the stereotype that women and minorities are not qualified aca-
demics: "If you don't believe that 'qualified' such persons exist, then you cannot
recognize them even if they walk into your office."' 45
Finally, academics contend that universities are known for the quality of
their faculties as teacher-scholars, and consequently strive, in selection of faculty,
to achieve "teaching and scholarship of the highest order."' 4  Critics of affirma-
tive action argue that goals and timetables imposed on universities cause stan-
dards to be bent or broken, and force institutions to abandon the principle of
merit hiring."'
On the other side of this issue are those who seriously question whether, in
the face of the informal, subjective, "old-boy" system of faculty appointments,
any meaningful principle of merit hiring ever has existed in academia.' 4
Affirmative action advocates recognize the importance of competent faculty
143 Id. at 33-34.
144 Sandler, supra note 3, at 412. For statistical refutation of many of Lester's contentions,
see id. at 411-413.
145 Goodwin, supra note 62; see also Rumbarger, supra note 45, at 209; Sandier, supra
note 3, at 412.
146 R. LESTER, supra note 4. at 14.
147 See D. BELL, supra note 4, at 418; R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 28, 29; Glickstein &
Todorovich, supra note 92, at 15; Van Dyne, supra note 114. See also Nickel, supra note 144,
at 545; Rumbarger, supra note 45, at 210; see generally O'Neil, supra note 5, at 758-9.
148 Dr. Lewis examines letters of recommendation written by academics praising other
academics and analyzes the academic bureaucracy to reveal how extraneous, nonprofessional
criteria, particularly sex, influence the acceptance of a candidate and his/her work. As his
book's preface states, ". .. there is less attention given to excellence in research and, as is more
commonly acknowledged, in teaching than most persons both within and outside the university
seem to believe. The contention that the evaluation and advancement of academics turn on
merit is simply untrue." L. Lw ds, upra note 3. See also Sandler, supra note 3, at 409:
The old informality of academe is rife with discrimination. Merit is simply not enough.
The 'old boys' seek out young proteges who are then taught the informal ropes of the
profession. . . . It is difficult for women and minorities to be proteges: Men are
often uncomfortable having lunch with a female student, spending long hours in the
lab with them, or inviting minority students into their homes.
See also Glickstein & Todorovich, supra note 92, at 15-16; Goldstein, supra note 102, at 418:
The closed recruiting system so prevalent in higher education is quite successful in
isolating many of the most qualified women from contention, and the institutions must
be willing, through affirmative action, to break out of that system to achieve their
goals without sacrificing the quality they so loudly proclaim.
In articulatin$ his "Case Against Meritocracy," Bell suggests that there never can be a
true meritocracy, in view of such factors as chance, genetics, and the social compulsion of
parents to pass on their positions to their children. D. BELL, supra note 4, at 427-33.
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members in higher education, 49 yet contend that no principle of hiring the best
qualified individual could be threatened by regulations which require the hiring
of the best person on the basis of merit and without discrimination. 50 Some
observers go so far as to suggest that diluting the merit principle might be a
positive goal of government regulation. Professor Bell, for example, discusses
the possibility that educational institutions are assuming a disproportionate in-
fluence in our society,"' reflecting the widely-recognized fact that university
degrees are becoming necessary, though sometimes vacuous, credentials.5 '
According to Bell, meritocracy does not assure equality of opportunity; rather,
it merely creates new inequality in each generation.5" Thus, according to these
jaundiced views of academic merit, employing a faculty member at least in part
on the basis of race or sex as a means of breaking the cycle of inferior education,
poverty, unemployment, and discrimination, has at least as great a moral
justification as many of the criteria currently being used other than merit.154
VI. Where Do We Go From Here? A Rationale for a Policy of Preference
Of the difficulties, catalogued above, which have plagued implementation
of affirmative action since 1968, the most profound is contained in the view ex-
pressed so forcefully by Nathan Glazer: that the heritage of discrimina-
tion can be overcome simply by attacking discrimination; that the proper focus
of affirmative action is equality of opportunity and not equality of result.155 In
answer to the assertion that there is no way to insure employment of women and
minorities without discrimination,' 56 it must first be pointed out that there is no
way to demonstrate nondiscrimination without showing results. In purely prag-
matic terms, nothing short of statistics revealing women and minorities occupy-
ing faculty positions will be sufficient proof that equality of opportunity is in
fact being provided; there is no way to measure nondiscrimination.'i
149 See L. L~wis, supra note 3, at 201-209; Nickel, supra note 133. at 545. Some wonder,
however, why institutions of higher education in particular should be free to seek out the best,
regardless of whether business does. Does not every pursuit have its excellence, and should
not every excellence be encouraged? See N. Glazer, supra note 81, at 60.
150 Sandler, supra note 3, at 411. The Guidelines require only that the employer make
"additional efforts to recruit, employ and promote qualified members of groups formerly ex-
cluded," supra, note 25, and the Holmes memorandum of December 1974 reasserted that
institutions should hire the best qualified candidate for faculty positions. See note 35, supra.
151 D. BELL, supra note 4, at 419-20.
152 Id. at 409-10.
153 Id. at 428.
154 See Greenberg, Affirmative Action, Quotas and Merit, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1976, at 21,
col. 2.
155 See N. GLAZER, supra note 51.
156 Espousing Glazer's arguments and citing his book, Senator James L. Buckley recently
introduced Senate Bill 3069, to prohibit the use of racial, sexual or ethnic quotas in employ-
ment, by stating, "There is no way to insure a certain result other than by discriminating."
Senator Buckley's bill would reaffirm the federal government's role in requiring contractors to
submit affirmative action plans to assure nondiscrimination, but would limit such programs to
attempts to expand the pool of applicants. The government would be prohibited from requiring
the collection of data regarding race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and no finding of
discrimination would be based solely on the composition of a contractor's workforce.
157 If numerical ratios alone can prove discrimination, then any relief which fails to end
the statistical disparity is itself discriminatory-or at least inadequate to remove vestiges of
discrimination. 8 HAxv. Civ. RGTs L. REv. at 135. Under the operation of truly equal oppor-
tunity, women and minorities theoretically should be represented in the academic workforce
in the same proportion as they are represented in the general population. It is for this reason
that gross statistical disparities evidence discrimination and that remedying the disparity is the
only objective measure of equality. See id. at 154-5. See also note 105, supra.
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Secondly, and even more important, is the fact that a solution to the
affirmative action dilemma cannot be expected to spring full-blown from any
definition of equal opportunity. There is a higher value to be fulfilled, and it
requires going beyond mere nondiscrimination. Legalistic descriptions of what is
required to provide every American an equal starting position in life's race must
focus on maximizing each individual's self-fulfillment. Seen in this light, affirma-
tive action calls for the creation of a structure to promote human growth and
attainment of capabilities, not as a response to any mere legal right, but as part
of a larger interest in the quality of life.
Abraham Maslow, a "humanistic" psychologist, developed a hierarchial
theory of human motivation which is helpful in framing both a policy rationale
and a structure for implementation of human motivation. Based on a personal
growth concept of human nature which envisions individuals as possessing almost
infinite potential, moving in a forward direction and seeking to maximize their
self-development,' Maslow's hierarchy of human needs starts at the lowest
physiological level and culminates with self-actualization.' 59 The strongest needs,
those at the lower level which more strongly motivate an individual's behavior
and which are inherently more important than the higher needs, must be
satisfied first. When one level of need is satisfied, the next level becomes an in-
dividual's dominant motivator. Self-actualization, the highest level attained
only late in life, encompasses the person's desire to maximize his full potential. 6 '
Maslow believed that the need hierarchy was based on hereditary traits common
to all.' 6' He also recognized that extra-psychic determinants, such as culture,
family, environment, and learning, shape an individual's potential for achieving
self-actualization.
According to Maslow, social and organizational conditions may prevent the
attainment of personal fulfillment. 6" ' It is precisely for that reason that mere
nondiscrimination in the name of affirmative action is not enough. Even assum-
ing that individuals differ in natural endowments, each, hopefully, strives for
158 A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970); A. MASLOW, TOWARD A
PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (2d ed. 1968).
159 Maslow divided the hierarchy of human motivation, based on mankind's biological pro-
pensities, into deficiency-motivated needs: physiological, safety, belonging, love, respect, self-
esteem, and growth-motivated needs. Id. at 30.
160 For a more detailed discussion of Maslow's view of human motivation, see Solomon,
Toward A Federal Policy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of Corporations, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1263, 1267-72 (1975).
161 See A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING, supra note 158, at 160, 190-91; A.
MASLOW.MoTIVATION AND PERSONALITY, supra note 158, ch. 6; Smith, Self Actualization: A
Transambient Examination of a Focal Theme in Maslow's Psychology. 13 J. HUMANISTIC
PSYCHOLOGY 17 (1973).
162 A. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING, supra note 158, at 190-97; A. MASLOW,
MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY, supra note 158, at 93-94. See also E. FROMM, THE SANE SocI-
ETY 12-13, 69 (1955); Etzioni, Basic Human Needs, Alienation and Authenticity, 33 Am. Soc.
REV. 870 (1968). For the view that culture preceded the development of the human brain, see
Geertz, The Transition of Humanity, in HORIZONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY 42 (S. Tax ed. 1968) ;
Washburn & Howell, Human Evolution and Culture, in 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MAN: EVOLUTION
AFTER DARWIN (S. Tax ed. 1960). See generally Wilcox, Hierarchy, Human Nature, and the
Participative Panacea, 29 PUB. AD. REV. 53, 57-59 (1969). Others have stressed the impor-
tance of individual differences in achievement, motivation and aspirations, plasticity and adapt-
ability. See. e.g., J. VEROFF & S FELD, MARRIAGE AND WORK IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF NO-
TIVES AND ROLES (1970) ; Hackman & Lawler, Employee Reaction to Job Characteristics, 55 J.
APP. PSYCHOLOGY 259 (1971).
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personal self-fulfillment, and the institutions of society, rather than impeding
individual growth, must establish procedures for regulating fairly the competi-
tion and exchanges necessary to fulfill these individually diverse desires and
competences.
The problem of women and minorities in higher education must be seen in
this institutional context. The difficulty with equal opportunity as a principle
for denying all criteria other than talent and ambition for determining place in
academia is that the institution itself has impeded and restricted the access and
advancement of women and minorities. Where the problem is institutional, a
vague requirement of mere nondiscrimination is an inappropriate and sterile
remedy; where the consequences of discrimination are viewed realistically, it is
obvious that a mere order to "cease and desist" is not enough. A rationale for the
concept of preference rests on compensation and the production of societal
benefits, now and in the future.
The proper objective of affirmative action is not just ending an era of dis-
crimination, but overcoming its effects. To illustrate that objective, former
President Lyndon Johnson used the image of a shackled runner:
Imagine a hundred yard dash in which one of the two runners has his
legs shackled together. He has progressed 10 yards, while the unshackled
runner has gone 50 yards. How do they rectify the situation? Do they
merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they could
say that "equal opportunity" now prevailed. But one of the runners would
still be forty yards ahead of the other. Would it not be the better part of
justice to allow the previously shackled runner to make-up the forty yard
gap; or to start the race all over again? That would be affirmative action
towards equality. 63
As the example illustrates, when historically disadvantaged groups exist beside
more advantaged groups, it simply is not possible to achieve equality and fairness
by applying neutral principles. Justice requires compensating for past injuries,
not just forbidding their re-occurrence.
Compensatory justice requires more than just an assurance of future "good
behavior;" rather, it requires that benefits be provided to those individuals who
have been wrongfully injured in order to raise them to the level they would now
have if they had not been disadvantaged. In essence, compensation justifies
receiving more in the present than would be fair if past losses were not con-
sidered. Thus preferential policies may be warranted for those members of
groups who were previously unable to acquire faculty positions due to discrimina-
tion.Y
4
Compensatory principles may be seen as creating obligations among groups
in society in at least two instances. First, compensation may be required where
163 Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 402-410 (1970).
164 At one extreme, a preference may mean no more than tipping the balance in favor of
one candidate when all other factors are roughly equal. At the other extreme, is the fixed
quota for members of the preferred groups. A wide range of options exists between these
extremes. For an excellent discussion of preferences based on compensatory justice, see Nickel,
supra note 114, at 537-9; see also B. BrrTrKER, supra note 127; Miller, The Case for Positive
Discrimination, 4 Socu POLICY 65 (1973); see generally O'Neil, supra note 5.
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one group injures another or unjustly enriches itself at another's expense."
Secondly, the obligation to provide special benefits may arise when society in
general, rather than one group, has been responsible for deprivation to any
group. The type of compensatory justice provided, therefore, may be seen as
a response to the manner in which the obligation to compensate arose. For
example, where one group injures another, it may be equitable for the injuring
group to bear the entire burden of compensation, while when discrimination is
viewed as societal, justice may be a distributive principle which requires arrang-
ing social and economic inequalities so that all groups have a share of the burdens
and the benefits.166
The long-range rationale of such a policy justifies the preference in terms of
pure social utility, since the promotion of public welfare of the whole, by satisfy-
ing humanity's common interest in abatement of discrimination and amelioration
of its effects, results in a lessening of the social conflict, resentment and strife
which result from inequality.'67 Thus a preferential policy for minorities and
women in academia is a means to a legal, moral, and socially desirable end.'
Neither will a method of preferential treatment upset an academic system
that has allegedly been run strictly on the basis of merit and competence. Even
were it possible to evaluate effectiveness in teaching 6 . or to objectively measure
the quality of research or publication, the fact remains that colleges in general
have never been noted for hiring and promoting faculty strictly on the basis of
merit. 7 It is time to demythologize the image of the academic man (and the
word "man" is used deliberately), and realize that the principle of merit does not
guide academia any more than it does other occupations.
The first crack in the facade of academic merit may be seen in the con-
fusion that has long existed concerning the very role of the professor. The rela-
165 See Nickel, supra note 114, at 538.
166 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 9-10 (1971); see D. BELL, supra note 4, at 440, 445;
Nickel, supra note 114, at 539.
167 See Nickel, supra note 114, at 541; Affirmatiue Action in Higher Education: A Report
by the Council on Discrimination, 59 AAUP BULL. 178, 183 (1973) [hereinafter referred to
as "AAUP"]; Fuerst, Quotas as an Instrument of Public Interest, 4 SOCIAL POLICY 11, 21
(1973). This theme of preference in a transnational concept is developed in Solomon, Multi-
national Corporations and the Emerging World Order, CASE WEST. R.ES. J. INTERN'L. L.
(1975).
168 The most common use of preferential policies in the United States has been to provide
special educational and employment opportunities for veterans. See note 131, supra. Although
veterans' benefits may be justified as compensation for services rendered, they also provide
compensation for injuries suffered and opportunities lost during service time.
169 Why is a definition of good teaching so elusive? In one sense it is not elusive at all.
You can define good teaching any way you like. Simply take any outcome, process,
or quality that seems desirable, and then define good teaching as whatever something
called a teacher does to bring it about efficiently. Even a cursory fishing in the
literature will net such definitions by the dozen. Good teaching has been defined as
what the 'teacher' does to produce inspired pupils, excited pupils, interested pupils,
creative pupils; pupils who are good citizens, who can read, do arithmetic problems
and write grammatical English essays. Among other desiderata used to define good
teaching are critical thinking, subject matter mastery, ideals, love of freedom, respect
for law and order, universal brotherhood, various attributes of character, a love of
learning and a devotion to the arts. I am sure one can add another hatful of items to
this list.
Broudy, Can We Define Good Teaching? 70 TEACH. COLL. REC. 583-84 (1969), quoted in
L. LEwis, supra note 3, at 19.
170 See L. LEwis, supra note 3, at 13; T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE, THE ACADEMIC MARKET-
PLACE 80-93 (1958) ; Fuerst, supra note 167, at 21.
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tive importance of assessment of merit must be illusive at best in the absence of
agreement as to what functions the ideal professor performs and with what em-
phasis. For example, while most professors are hired to perform teaching services
for their universities, their evaluations as candidates for vacant positions or for
promotions often are made principally in terms of their research contributions in
their disciplines."'
Furthermore, as concerns the actual teaching performance of faculty mem-
bers, it is apparent that, even in most leading universities, little precise informa-
tion about the teaching of individual faculty is secured. Rather than by system-
atic evaluation by peer observation according to established criteria of effective-
ness, there is evidence that what is known about a faculty member's classroom
performance is constructed from rumor, gossip, and other random means."7
Though classroom teaching is universally cited as the most important single
factor in evaluating faculty members, the evidence relied on often seems skimpy,
irrelevant or unreliable. In short, the whole business of teaching effectiveness
must be regarded as an "empirical wasteland." 73
In view of past, feeble efforts to assess classroom performance in a rational
manner, it might be expected that academic competence is measured by scholarly
research and publication: hence, the oft-heard notion that faculty members
must "publish or perish." Indeed, statistics still appear to bear out Caplow and
McGee's assertion eighteen years ago that "[i]t is neither an overgeneralization
nor an oversimplification to state that in the faculties of major universities in the
United States today, the evaluation of performance is based almost exclusively on
publication of scholarly books or articles in professional journals as evidence of
research activity."'7 4 Also borne out by recent studies, however, is their con-
clusion that "a faculty member who is able to publish at all, however, is not
impossibly handicapped, since the actual number of publications necessary to
meet tenure requirements at most universities is not large."'7 5 In all except a few
leading institutions less than 10 percent of the faculty reportedly accounts for
171 T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE, supra note 170, at 82. A study made in 1966 by the American
Council on Education revealed that scholarly research and publications were used to determine
teaching skill in 70.0% of the colleges of Arts and Science responding. L. LEwss, supra note
3, at 22.
172 L. LEwis, supra note 3, at 23. In 1966, the American Council on Education tabulated
the responses of 1,100 deans to the question of how their faculty's undergraduate teaching was
evaluated. Responses from deans of 110 colleges of Arts and Sciences that were units of large
universities - where meritocratic principles are ostensibly well-implanted - reveal that the
chairman's evaluation was a primary source of information about classroom performance in
98.2% of such colleges. In 71.8% of the colleges, an evaluation made by the dean himself
was next in importance as a source of information. Colleague opinion was considered in 62.0%
of the college. Only 2.0% utilized classroom visits for evaluating teaching competence, and
only 35.0% considered student opinion. Astin & Lee, Current Practices in the Evaluation and
Training of College Teachers, in IMPROVING COLLEGE TEACHING 296-311 (C. Lee ed. 1967).
A 1960 report of the Committee on College Teaching of the American Council on Education
notes that "the most frequently cited sources of information can be described simply as hearsay."
Gustad, Policies and Practices in Faculty Evaluation, 42 EDUC. Rc. 203 (1961), quoted in
L. LEWIs, supra note 3, at 23.
173 L. Lzwis, supra note 3, at 26.
174 T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE, supra note 170, at 83; see also note 170, supra.
175 Id. at 82.
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more than 90 percent of all published research. 7  Thus it appears that the pub-
lish or perish doctrine may be more fiction than fact in the average institution
of higher education, where some critics charge that it is used to promote the
idea that an objective standard is used in arriving at decisions on hiring and
promotion which in reality are made subjectively."'
The extreme subjectivity of the hiring and promotion policies in academia
most strongly refutes the notion that colleges and universities run on the merit
principle. Non-academic considerations, often including information of a
personal and non-professional nature, regularly intrude in evaluation of can-
didates for academic positions. In his study of 295 letters of recommendation
written by professors of sociology, chemistry, and English literature in the United
States in the late 1960's, sociologist Lionel Lewis concluded that faculty positions
are gained at least as much by ascription as by achievement. Lewis also pointed
to the important role of such non-academic considerations as family, personality,
and "ability to fit into the department."'7 5
Prominent in the letters studied by Lewis is the theme that if an individual
is congenial, cooperative, and likeable or effective in interaction, such a can-
didate will have "no difficulty in fitting into [a] colleague group."' 79 It is telling
that a disclaimer such as "I have no firsthand information, but I would guess
from what I have seen [or heard] that .. . ," often qualifies as information re-
garding teaching. Few persons described in the letters are not articulate and/or
well-organized, intelligent and/or competent, congenial, cooperative, pleasant
and/or warm.' Enthusiasm is another highly-valued attribute.'- The over-
176 Wilson, The Professor and His Roles, in IMPROVING COLLEGE TEACHING, supra note
172, at 104-5. "[Elvidence indicates that the publication record of most academics is rather
skimpy. In their study of 2,451 social scientists. Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr.,
found that only 1,377 of them had published three or more papers and that only 861 had
published a book, aside from their dissertations." L. LEwIs, supra note 3, at 31. A survey
published in 1970 by the Carnegie Commission study on the Future of Higher Education and.
the American Council on Education revealed that approximately 30% had published only
one to four papers and slightly over 14% had produced between five and ten publications.
Only 26.6% had published eleven or more papers. College and University Faculty, 1971
Dio. EDuc. STAT. 83. See D. BROWN, THE MOBILE PROFESSORS 68-73 (1967); see generally
L. Lewis, supra note 3, at 30-35.
177 One author has stated that " 'publish-or-perish' is largely a myth popularized by the
few poor teachers who, lacking the one credential for tenure appointment, did indeed perish
when found lacking in the other." Cartter, University Teaching and Excellence, in IMPROVINO
COLLEGE TEACHING, supra note 172, at 160; see L. LEwIs, supra note 3, at 40-42.
178 See L. LEwis, supra note 3, at 50-82. 109-146. Lewis explains the use of letters of
recommendation on the basis that "to the degree that the intent of such letters is to help
establish academic qualifications, the introduction of other kinds of information opens to
question the primacy of professional considerations in the recruitment of faculty." Id. at 50.
See also T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE, supra note 170, at 87-93.
179 Id. at 59. One letter mentioned thirteen scholars at whose feet the candidate had studied.
180 Id. at 57; see also T. CAPLOW & R. McGEB, supra note 170, at 125.
181 The following is an excellent summary of the way the merits of candidates typically
are evaluated:
We take a good look at their letters and then when they're down here we look at
them and talk to them and then we take a good look into our crystal ball and pull
out the best man. In other words, we're completely subjective about the whole thing.
It's usually fairly simple. You can tell from a ten-minute conversation if a man will
be a good teacher .... What counts is drive and imagination .... We can't afford
to hire any other way. There is no other way of judging a man's research and
scholarly capacities. It's extremely time-consuming, but it works.
T. CAPLOW & R. McGaa, supra note 170, at 123-4.
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whelming majority of extra-academic factors mentioned bore on the question of
maintaining pleasant social relationships in a department." 2 By their extensive
emphasis on personality, Lewis concluded that academic departments are un-
willing to recruit candidates who will disrupt social relationships and upset the
statius quo.
While most evaluators recognize the necessity of recounting a candidate's
professional qualifications, they frequently lack specific information. The follow-
ing extrapolated assessments of teaching ability are typical:
Except for one lecture to my seminar (which was conducted with great verve
and enthusiasm) I have no information on [his] abilities as a teacher. I
should expect him to be good.
He is very poised and self-confident and very personable... He is probably
a very effective teacher.:18
To fill a void in discharging the responsibility of reviewing and measuring
professional quality, irrelevant personal criteria are embraced. In the event that
no meritorious accomplishment of the candidate comes easily to mind, letters
of recommendation frequently list names of widely-known persons with whom
the candidate has had some tie.' Or attention often is turned to the evaluator's
high opinion of the candidate's spouse.' In assessing their colleagues, academics
clearly are concerned with questions beyond professional performance; it would
appear that universities place less emphasis on technical competence than the
supporters of the standard of academic merit would lead us to believe.'
Other statistics similarly reveal the importance of seemingly extraneous
factors in the academic hiring process. For example, institutions are well en-
trenched in the habit of hiring their own graduates, and between eligible in-
dividuals of apparently equal ability and training, preference is very often shown
for "connections."'8 " Data indicate that the prestige of the institution from
which a candidate received the Ph.D. and the candidate's social class origin are
182 The first figures to establish widespread "inbreeding" among faculty resulted from a study
of all appointments at Indiana University between 1885 and 1937, which revealed that 43%
were alumni and 20% had family members on the staff. Hollingshead, Ingroup
Membership and Academic Selection, 3 Am. Soc. Rav. 831 (1938). After a recent exhaustive
analysis of the relationship of academic structure and scholarship, Peter Blau has concluded
that inbreeding has "adverse effects on faculty quality" in all academic settings. P. BLAU, Tnn
ORGANIZATION OF AcADEinc WOR 273 (1973), quoted in L. Lawis, supra note 3, at 111.
See also T. CAPLOW & R. McGF.. supra note 170, at 110-111, 132-3.
183 Crane, Social Class Origin and Academic Success: The Influence of Two Stratification
Systems on Academic Careers, 42 Soc. EDuc. 3-11 (1969).
184 See L. Luwis, supra note 3, at 120-123; T. CAPLOW & R. McGEE, supra note 170.
185 Id. at 109.
186 Id. at 111.
187 The American Association of University Professors has recognized "a certain circularity
in the verification of standards insofar as professors may discern 'excellence' in others who
resemble themselves, and thus, by their appointment and advancement decisions, generate the
proof that merit is the function of those resemblances." AAUP, supra note 167, at 181. In
affirming the principle of affirmative action, the report acknowledges that the denial of access
to women and minorities in part:
has resulted from unexamined presuppositions of professional fitness which have
tended to exclude from consideration persons who do not fall within a particular
definition of the acceptable academic person.... Insofar as few are called, the range
of choice must necessarily be a narrow one, and those fewer still who are chosen tend
to mirror the profession's image of what it is, not what it should or might be.
Id. at 179.
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as important as publications for hiring in leading universities."' 8 Obviously, since
candidates of lower social class origin, including members of minority groups,
are less likely to have received their degrees from prestigious institutions, they are
thus less likely to obtain positions in prestigious universities. As we have seen,
the cumulative effect of such ascriptive qualities as social class, prestige, and
ability to get in the status quo has been devastating for minorities and women.'
As Caplow and McGee noted, academic recruitment in theory is mostly
open, but in practice, it is mostly closed. Women and minorities tend to be ex-
cluded from the academic profession not always intentionally, and not solely
because they have low prestige, but because they are outside the prestige system
entirely. Fearing "Bogie-Man" candidates who "won't fit in," departments
invoke the so-called merit principle which assures their exclusion. Only by means
of a structure which requires something more, which is capable of re-structuring
academia by confronting restrictive standards of professional quality and opening
the hiring and promotion process, will the institutional scope of academic dis-
crimination be effectively countered.
An important element of this re-structuring is the development of appro-
priate meritocratic criteria, which recognize that there is no inherent conflict
between the principles of intellectual and scholarly merit and of equality of
access to the academic profession for all persons, and that the old model of
academic excellence was too narrow to serve individuals or society very well.
Equal opportunity, after all, involves more than the opportunity to develop
mediocre competence in the area of someone else's strength. Status in any con-
text is relative and on any single measure of status there will always be a lower
half. One way to reduce the number in the lower half is to expand the number of
dimensions on which status is measured. The concept of academic excellence
must be expanded to accommodate other values deemed important in our
society.
The application of a preference for women and members of minority groups
is thus a means of overcoming the misapplication of meritocratic principles,
rather than subverting them. Heretofore, academia has denied itself access to
great reservoirs of talent and intellectual vitality by ignoring the important
abilities and experience of disadvantaged and discriminated groups. As the
AAUP itself has recognized, institutions of higher education can justify the use
of preferential policies for the reason that the narrowness of its traditional
criteria must be considered deficient on the very grounds of excellence itself.
VII. Implementation of a Policy of Preference
Successful implementation of affirnative action in higher education requires
188 See AAUP, id. at 179; Miller, supra note 164, at 69-70.
189 See AAUP, id. Ironically, academia long has recognized the value of employing pref-
erences in student admissions policies. For example, colleges and universities have always
sought out and made concessions to holders of particular non-quantifiable talents, such as
leadership, character, and ability to kick a field goal. Similar relaxation of admissions criteria
has been utilized where the applicant is physically handicapped, the offspring of an alumnus or
faculty member, or a resident of the proper geographic area. O'Neil, supra note 5, at 703-5;
see B. THRESHER, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 56, 57, 59-61 (1966).
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acceptance of three basic tenets. First, some form of preference for hiring and
promotion of women and members of minority groups is both necessary in order
to benefit heretofore disadvantaged groups and desirable for society as a whole.
Second, the costs which accompany these benefits must be spread as evenly as
possible across society. Finally, a more rational decision-making structure must
be established in order to implement affirmative action policies toward the
objective that, to the utmost extent possible, everyone benefits.
A preferential policy may be effective by continuation of the five categories
currently accepted by the federal government as warranting affirmative action.
Although undoubtedly both over-inclusive and under-inclusive with respect to
some individuals, these categories-blacks, American Indians, Orientals, Spanish-
surnamed, and women-do appear most reasonably to include the major dis-
advantaged groups existing today. Other groups alleging a pattern of discrimina-
tion, or individuals desiring relief, may assert their remedies under the provisions
of Title VII90 or through complaints filed with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission' g' or the Department of Labor.192 Rather than stream-
lining the enforcement process under one agency, as has been suggested,'93 the
present four-pronged approach, which provides multiple avenues of relief for the
discriminated and opportunity for diverse viewpoints to be heard, should be
continued.
The preference adopted should resemble that traditionally afforded to
veterans in this country; in other words, women and minorities should be deemed
additionally qualified by reason of their sex, race, or ethnic group.' In essence,
this system would involve including additional grounds of academic qualification
based on the overall contributions to the academic community, such as the
ability to serve as a "model" or "mentor."' 95 Rather than restricting the prefer-
ence to situations in which two candidates are deemed otherwise equally quali-
fied, as it currently is employed in a small minority of universities, it should be
exercised in favor of every candidate who is a member of a designated category,
since the determination of "equal" qualifications easily may be skewed by the
very factors of historic institutional discrimination which society should strive to
overcome. Moreover, while serving as compensation for past discrimination, such
a system of "bonus" qualification has the additional advantage of safeguarding
an important element of traditional meritocratic criteria in that candidates who
are totally unqualified will not be aided sufficiently by a few additional "points"
to attain a faculty position undeservediy. Thus the concept of academic merit
may be expanded but not abandoned.
By enacting a preference for certain groups, however, we must take care to
avoid forcing the entire burden of society's obligation onto hapless white males.
190 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 et seq. (1970).
191 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6 et seq. (1975).
192 See 40 C.F.R. § 60 et seq. (1971); 20 C.F.R. § 31.1 et seq. (1975).
193 See R. LESTER, supra note 2.
194 For example, a university utilizing a point system for evaluating candidates could award
five additional points to members of preferred groups.
195 The American Association of University Professors has endorsed this method of broaden-
ing the criteria for evaluating faculty. CARNEGIE CouNCm, supra note 2, at 129; see AAUP,
supra note 157, at 179.
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This is particularly true if it is concluded that society as a whole, not merely
white males, should bear the responsibility for institutional discrimination. If
society in general is responsible for past discrimination, then all members of
society have a role in bearing that responsibility; otherwise, all the costs of imple-
menting a desired social policy are borne by a group no more deserving of such
oppressive treatment than the groups formerly disadvantaged and now preferred
under affirmative action schemes.'9 6 In addition, and extremely important from
the standpoint of resource management, displacement of qualified white males
costs society the benefit of their participation in academia. Expansion of op-
portunities in higher education, therefore, is a basic necessity if affirmative action
is to be more than a zero-sum game in which the employed are required to lose
if the discriminated are to gain.
1 97
To insure an equal distribution of the burden, particularly in view of the
limited number of openings in the current and prospective academic job market,
continued participation of qualified white males in academia must be assured by
federal funding of additional faculty positions. Such can be accomplished either
through direct appropriations or by expanded government contracts for increased
research and additional educational facilities. 9 ' Like the comprehensive Health
Manpower Training Act of 1971,"' enacted to increase the number of places
in medical schools by rehabilitating and expanding current facilities as well as
constructing new ones, such a program would alleviate the discriminatory situ-
ation in academic hiring without displacing white male candidates. Meeting the
great financial cost of additional faculty positions, of course, would require a
reallocation of social resources in keeping with the priority of broadened human
development toward which our society must strive. With focus on the values
we advocate within the context of the social order we strive for, this adjustment
in federal expenditures may be not only practicable, but necessary."' The
14th amendment, after all, is a national commitment to a standard of
conduct; accepting it means accepting its ethical underpinnings and devising, by
whatever means available, the most acceptable remedy for its breach.2"'
A more rational framework for affirmative action decision-making requires
a broad-scale view of the problem, since any attempt to adjust the ratio of
minority to non-minority group members in academia will affect the individual
and group interests involved, as well as the interests of the institution, the aca-
196 For a discussion of this "enterprise liability" theory, see 8 HARV. Qv. RGTS. L. Rzv. at
163, 166; see also, Miller, supra note 164, at 67-9; see generally B. BITTKER, supra note 127, at
128-137.
197 For an analysis of the concept of synergy and the conflict resolution-through the
production of benefits for various sides in a dispute see A. MASLOW, THE FARTHER REACHES
OF HUMAN NATURE Ch. 4 (1971); J. & M. CRAIG, SYNERGIC POWER: BEYOND DOIsNATION
AND PERIMISSIVENESS (1974); Benedi, Synergy, 72 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 320 (1970).
198 See R. LESTER, supra note 4, at 150; CARNEGm COUNCIL, supra note 2, at 192; Miller,
supra note 164, at 69; Havighurst, Individual and Group Rights in a Democracy, 4 SOCIAL
POLICY 13, 26 (1976); Epstein, Reverse Discrimination, 118 Cong. Rec. 29788, 29790 (1972)
(added by Cong. Eilberg).
199 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1971).
200 One source of this revenue may be revealed by answering whether defense spending
really is, or should be, our nation's highest priority: Would we prefer to serve as a model of
excess military might or of equal opportunity?
201 See B. BiTTKER, supra note 5, at 26, for a discussion of reevaluating democratic priorities.
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demic community, and society at large °. 2" These interests must be isolated,
analyzed independently, and accommodated wherever possible. The following
proposals suggest such a framework.
First, goals and timetables should be continued, under the continued author-
ity of HEW. Categories of minority groups qualifying for a preference should
be re-evaluated at 10-year intervals and revised, if necessary, in terms of then
existing academic situations. This is required because of the hopefully changing
nature of the situation in terms of the available pool of candidates and the re-
habilitative action by higher education institutions. Goals and timetables should
not exceed a period of 10 years. 03
While it should be recognized that the Guidelines already are sufficiently
tailored to meet any special needs of academia,0 4 however, it must be empha-
sized that HEW needs assistance in reaching truly rational, acceptable decisions
concerning the acceptability of university plans for affirmative action. First,
experience has shown that the agency requires greater expertise and stronger
,emphasis on consistency among the ten regional Offices of Civil Rights. Accord-
ingly, stronger efforts and additional funding are required to provide sufficient
staff of high calibre.
Secondly, and extremely important, is the need for OCR to consider all
relevant factors before making its decision to accept or reject a university's
affirmative action plan. In order for the agency to appropriately evaluate the
circumstances and reach the most equitable decision, a vehicle must be estab-
lished to assure that agency officials hear as many voices and weigh as many
considerations as possible during the process of negotiation with the university.
In addition, a method should be inserted at the level of negotiation between a
university and the OCR to resolve any impasses which may arise in formulation
of the plan without resorting immediately to delay or cut-off of federal contracts.
To accomplish this objective, the university and HEW, as adverse parties, should
submit their differences to arbitration by individuals mutually selected. Such a
procedure would provide the opportunity for the fresh views of the arbitrators,
* under a "think tank" approach, to outline possible alternatives and hopefully to
break the deadlock."0 5 The arbitration would not be binding however, and
HEW-further enlightened by the arbitration process--still would pronounce the
final word concerning acceptability of the university's plan.
If dissatisfied with the outcome of negotiation, the university, of course,
would be free to pursue its traditional avenues of relief from the agency's action.
By assuring consideration of all possible views and incorporating input from
202 For a more detailed discussion isolating these relevant interests, see 8 HAv. CIv. ROTS.
L. Rv. at 159.
203 The Carnegie Council has recommended that timetables should be set for periods not
exceeding five to ten years. Carnegie Council's Affirmative Action Recommendations, CrrRON.
H. EDuc. 3, 4 (1975).
204 Congress rejected the idea that academia warranted more special treatment in 1972, by
amending Title VII to delete the exemption for educational institutions. See Sandler, supra
note 3, at 416.
205 Lester has advocated the use of arbitration to handle individual grievances at the uni-
versity level by resort to a panel of outside faculty members. See R. LESTER, supra note 4,
at 96. Given the possible biases of faculty members, however, it would appear preferable to
rely on traditional arbitration techniques, particularly where, as here, expertise in education
may not prove as valuable as a common-sense, fresh perspective.
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impartial arbitrators, this scheme affords the greatest assurance that the agency's
decision will in fact have been made rationally. The plan offers the further
probability that all relevant factors will be weighed and that a creative, mutually
satisfactory solution will be reached without resort to the courts. Although the
result of this procedure is compromise rather than strict adherence to the notions
of "legal rights" often asserted by minority and white members of the academic
community, it is essential to recognize the necessity of compromise in such a
volatile, complex situation where no solution can be viewed as a unitary cir-
curmstance and the best result is a balance of diverse interests, rights, and obliga-
tions.
Finally, institutions of higher education must accept their primary re-
sponsibility for creating equal opportunity and maximizing individual fulfillment
in academia. Essential to this effort is a thorough re-examination and revision
of the procedures and criteria utilized in faculty selection and promotion. Of
extreme importance also is development by colleges and universities of grievance
procedures which begin and conclude, where possible, at the university level.
To further this objective, individual allegations of discrimination and complaints
by groups which are not recognized by HEW as deserving of preference should
be heard by an arbitration panel whose decision would be nonbinding on the
university and the federal government."0 6 Such a procedure has the advantage
of being more expedient than litigation, less costly, and more likely to produce
a mutually acceptable outcome. Furthermore, it may allow for recognition of
local or regional minority groups or specific disadvantaged individuals as deserv-
ing of a preference due to local circumstances which would not be warranted on
a national basis.
VIII. Conclusion
A society, we believe, should promote institutions and arrangements which
will further human growth and development as part of a larger interest in the
quality of life. Implicit in the analysis of affirmative action lies a reassessment
of the role of higher educational institutions in society. While higher educational
institutions must serve society by stressing knowledge and quality, they must also
meet their obligations to serve individuals-faculty members, students and
citizens-who are members of disadvantaged groups. By facing the problem of
affirmative action with a broad contextual view and with the goal of maximizing
individual fulfillment, it is possible to implement a policy of preference, as
developed in this article, for disadvantaged groups in academia. Such a policy
will yield benefits for both society and disadvantaged persons.
206 See R. LEsmaE, supra note 4, at 96; Carnegie Council's Affirmative-Action Recom-
mendations, id. at 4; LaNoue, supra note 48; but see Sandier, supra note 4, at 414.
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